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Abstract

Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of the West is just as poignant now as it was at the
time of his writing. Arguably, his commentary on nihilism, decadence and the last men
are of special interest, because of the ways in which we currently see his predictions as
they function in the modem world. Nietzsche challenges us throughout his work to
respond to the claim of the madman in “The Parable of the Madman” - what have we
done to make ourselves worthy of the death of God? For Nietzsche, the idiosyncratic
niceties of modem society are just residuum of the herd morality; and if man was truly
desirous of returning to excellence, he would appropriate Nietzsche’s philosophy and
embrace the tragic age.
Nietzsche’s secular case for suffering presents a worldview underpinned by
violence. Emphasizing the tragic man as the excellent, Nietzsche is demonstrating to
readers that, in a truly revalued society, nothing that necessitates respect for concepts like
equality and dignity. Instead, Nietzsche takes a drastically different approach to the
“problem” of modern man, advocating for those things which would remove structures of
comfort and necessitate suffering. In this way, suffering is a vehicle for both knowledge
and greatness. To the extent we want great culture, Nietzsche argues, we must accept
great suffering.
Concerning liberalism in the modernized, and secularized, world, Nietzsche’s
views are telling. Once we have placed ourselves on the same level as Nietzsche
regarding rejection of universal morality, what justifications do we have to reject his
desire for suffering, in favor of our own comfort and decadence? It is this question that

this paper will seek to address, focusing on Nietzsche’s views on suffering and rejection
of universal standards.

NIETZSCHE AND THE POLITICS OF SUFFERING

A THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of Master of Arts in Law and Governance

by
CANDICE BARBARA MANERI
Montclair State University
Montclair, NJ
May 2015

Copyright © 2015 by Candice Barbara Maneri. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my husband Keith, my parents, and my friends and family
for their continued support of my intellectual pursuits. It is with the utmost gratitude that
I would like to thank my mentor and friend, Dr. Brian Smith, for inflicting upon me an
academic training that has allowed me to fulfill my potential as an academic beast o f
prey. Without his continued help, this thesis would not have been possible. His influence
has encouraged me to seek the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.

Contents

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1 Nietzschean Man................................................................................................ 19
Chapter 2 Meaning and Suffering in the Greek Tragedy............................................ 61
Chapter 3 Nietzsche and Modernity: The Last Man in Progressive Thought........... 85
Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 103

vi

Introduction
In Italy for 30 years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, and
bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the
Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love - they had 500 years of
democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.
— Harry Lime, The Third Man

“God is dead,” Friedrich Nietzsche confidently proclaims in his famous “Parable
of the Madman,” and “we have killed him.”1 Concerning public opinion in the West,
Nietzsche is mostly correct in his assertion - arguments about the rightness o f this state
of affairs aside, it is difficult to deny the effects of secularization on philosophy.
Modernity has ushered in release from once held canonical views; and, in the wake of
this death of divinity, how we conceive of ourselves and our society takes on new
meaning. It is in light of this new age that Nietzsche addresses his audience, challenging
them to make themselves worthy of such an act. Within a universe where one has
accepted the role of the practical atheist, how do we make ourselves worthy of self
deification? It is this question Nietzsche responds to in his work - and his answer ought
to give us pause: in suffering, we realize the crucible of human greatness.
Nietzsche bemoans modernity and what he perceives to be a loss o f culture and
authenticity. His views of the contemporary world encompass a critique o f morality stemming from Plato onward, it is the imposition of the herd that Nietzsche identifies as
the grossest atrocity to curse humankind. Conceptualizations of universal principle, for
Nietzsche, are the hallmark of the weak; and, Nietzsche identifies the modem world as an
expression of their success. The malaise of the era rests in the maintenance o f vestigial
imprints of traditional morality, in spite of society’s apparent secularization. What is
1 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science: with a prelude in rhymes and an appendix o f songs, trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 181.
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needed in order to revalue the existing moral system necessarily requires Dionysian
expressions of man’s unleashed will. In other words, the revaluation of morals Nietzsche
so desires requires a violent bloodletting to unchain the overman from the fate of the last
men.
Nietzsche’s philosophy has powerful implications for the present. Absent the
constraints of traditional morality and universals, Nietzsche’s self-consciously titled
philosophy of the future is coming to fruition on our philosophical doorsteps - and to the
extent that we appropriate his epistemological and metaphysical critiques, we have
already opened our doors to this potentially unwelcome house guest. What has ultimately
occurred since his writing is an incomplete appropriation of his thought. The acceptance
of an entirely relativistic moral theory, without the additional acceptance of Nietzsche’s
aesthetic tastes and values, makes for, utilizing his own terminology, bad air. Simply put,
the secularization of the modem world has undertaken to accept pieces of Nietzsche’s
moral theory, without also accepting the substance of his argument in relation to
spiritedness and suffering. It is this relationship between suffering and our treatment of
this suffering that is essential to the Nietzschean ethos - all men suffer, great men
overcome. Without the presence of suffering, the revaluation loses its artistic and
intellectual value, and we are left with precisely what Nietzsche himself hated - comfort,
decadence, and the common.
In this way, appropriating Nietzsche as a thinker who can defend, found or
structure liberal thought is contrary to his world view. Throughout his work, Nietzsche is
disgusted by the egalitarian ethos that underpins liberal thinking; and at best, one can
really only imagine the logical extensions of Nietzsche’s revaluation to lead to Aristotle’s
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greater regime types - aristocracy, or potentially polity. There is no “kinder gentler”
Nietzsche, and painting Nietzsche as a democratic thinker in the abstract neglects entire
swaths of what Nietzsche really said and offends his tastes toward what man ultimately
is.
Man, for Nietzsche, is not equal. If he is great, he is a disciple of Dionysius, an
actor of rapture, an artist unleashing his individualistic and spirited will upon existence.
Yet, not all men are great. These weak men are dangers to the great insofar as they are
successful in their attempts to rein in the strength of great men. Envy is the trade o f the
weak, and their overt weakness does not preclude them from craftiness. Unable to
overcome the strong on their own turf, the only way the herd can attempt to reverse their
roles with the strong is through the imposition of psychological force.2 Thus, we see
Nietzsche’s argument that morality, as the instrument of the weak, is simply an example
of such force. The past two thousand years, in this regard, are a testament to the
subversion of the strong by the priestly classes - and in their sniveling and fairytale
making their cleverness truly shows, for they have succeeded in chaining Goliath.
Nietzsche suggests, however, that these chains can be broken. His remedy: Pre-Socratic
thought, or Greek tragedy.
In his rejection of morality, Nietzsche recognizes that man effectually needs a
replacement for the loss of meaning that comes with the proverbial death of God. Within
the context of a divinely ordered universe, suffering is given significance for a multitude
of reasons. Despite the reasoning, what makes suffering in this context different than a
purely nihilist understanding is its function as a means to an end. Suffering has meaning,

2 The use o f the term “psychological” in this context is narrowly defined to encompass those
things which act upon our minds, as opposed to our physical bodies.
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and in turn we do not despair of it entirely. Consider what Mircea Eliade says in The
Myth o f the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History:
The critical moment of the suffering lies in its appearance; suffering is perturbing
only insofar as its cause remains undiscovered. As soon as the sorcerer or the
priest discovers what is causing children or animals to die, drought to continue,
rain to increase, game to disappear, the suffering begins to become tolerable; it
has a meaning and a cause, hence it can be fitted into a system and explained.3
Religion serves as this explanatory vehicle. Even Nietzsche concedes that man needs this
kind of explanation, yet he finds the Christian answer to suffering rife with weakness.
The adherent to Christianity is given an answer to suffering that is necessarily
passive - you are called to trust that your sufferings are meaningful, and that an allpowerful God has designed the universe in a way that fallen man cannot understand
completely. Suffering is understood as the work of a divine being, and as subservient
characters to this divine will, we accept that our pain is the will of this being. The
acceptance of suffering is a work of faith. Psalm 38, Prayer of an Afflicted Sinner,
demonstrates the Christian position in light of suffering:
I am very near to failing; my pain is with me always. I acknowledge my guilt and
grieve over my sin. But many are my foes without cause, a multitude of enemies
without reason, Repaying me evil for good, harassing me for pursuing good.
Forsake me not, O Lord; my God, be not far from me! Come quickly to help me,
my Lord and my salvation!
This religious framework stands in direct opposition to the strength of the ancients. The
proud Spartan would see such submission as a sign of weakness. It is this weakness that
Nietzsche disdains in Christianity, and in his writings he reconstructs its fiercest
opposition in ancient Greek culture.

3 Eliade, Mircea, The Myth o f the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991), 98.
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In his rejection of morality, Nietzsche recognizes that man effectually needs a
replacement for the loss of meaning that comes with the proverbial death of God. In a
world colored by the words of Silenus in Eudemos “The best thing is utterly beyond your
reach not to have been bom, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for
you is: to die soon,” Nietzsche offers his audience reprieve in Greek Tragedy.4 Art is an
expression of Nietzschean truth: to the extent that such a thing exists, it must be created.
The artist effectually crafts truth through the creative elements of Apollo and Dionysus;
his art is an expression of his inner will. Which is effectually all he has in a world that
negates the idea that there are moral truths or eternal souls. Rather than seeking refuge in
rational order and reason, Nietzsche advocates for a tragic culture, built upon the
semblance of Apollo and the intoxicated festival of Dionysus. Suffering is thus
represented in art to provide meaning to counteract the nothingness of the abyss. Man
needs his moments of order - of the Apolline dreamlike illusionary semblance; yet, he
also needs moments of rapture and destruction - embodied by the Dionysiac.
The underpinning message of Birth o f Tragedy clearly defines the parameters of
Greek tragedy, and sets up the tension with Platonism that appears throughout the breadth
of Nietzsche’s work. It is through his ruminations in Birth o f Tragedy that Nietzsche
identifies the quintessential problem with Western philosophy, and more importantly,
Western culture - the loss of meaning in a world where reason is imposed as the highest
good. While it is Nietzsche’s argument that the most excellent things were bom of
ancient Greece (namely, tragedy), also springing from this great culture was one of the
worst influences on human thought, Socrates. In the preface to his Beyond Good and
4 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth o f Tragedy in The Birth o f Tragedy and Other Writings, ed.
Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs and trans. Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999)23.
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Evil, Nietzsche artfully reveals the whole of his philosophical mission to his readers,
posing the question, “Could Socrates have been the corrupter of the youth after all? And
did he deserve his hemlock?”5 In reference to tragedy itself, the suggestion that Socrates
was in fact the “corrupter” of the youth, is intensely poignant to Nietzsche’s view. With
Socrates came the end of excellent culture. With reason comes the silence of all excellent
art, and thus, excellent men.
It is with a stem acuteness that Nietzsche identifies the epicenter of traditional
western philosophy - and through his reconstruction of the relationship between reason
and morality, Nietzsche defines the character of Socrates as the destroyer o f tragic
thought. Nietzsche’s assault on reason provides the context by which we cannot ignore
Greek tragedy - as many readers of Nietzsche often do.6 In the wake of Nietzsche’s
refutation of the immutable universal, the pre-Socratic man emerges as the Nietzschean
ideal. It is fitting to view the interplay of elemental aspects of early Greek art as primary
expressions of what Nietzsche’s true intent was when he vividly describes the
spiritedness of the beast of prey.

n

Nietzsche’s philosophy comes alive in the elemental aspects of Greek tragedy.
Distance, a recurring theme of Nietzsche’s thought, is expressed through the distinction
between the Dionysian rapture and the dreamlike semblance of Apollo. Yet, just as the

5 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f the Future, trans.
Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 2.
6 Nietzsche criticized his approach in The Birth o f Tragedy in “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,”
which was printed in the second edition o f his book - over ten years after the original publication o f his
work. This being said - while Nietzsche criticizes the rather clumsy style, he upholds the importance o f his
work in regards to the Greeks and their importance within the purview o f his thought — I agree with
Nietzsche’s critique, and argue that The Birth o f Tragedy is a work full o f provocative ideas central to an
understanding o f his thought as a whole.
7 We are introduced to the concept o f the beast o f prey in The Genealogy o f Morals - and it is
through this description where we can illustrate Nietzsche’s view o f man in his most excellent form.
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strong and weak distinction is made between the classes of people, it is clear throughout
the evolution of Nietzsche’s work that the stronger class amongst the aesthetic ideals is
the Dionysiac.8 The work of the later Nietzsche captures the essence o f rapture as the
highest form of art. Antichrist, Twilight o f the Idols and Thus Spoke Zarathustra all
demonstrate a clear illustration of the position of Nietzsche as advocate for the
Dionysian. Nietzsche sees the demolition of traditional morality as the path back to
tragedy - or a tragic culture.
How we can thus return to the time of great men is particularly interesting in the
context of the main thesis at hand. Suffering is of utmost importance to mankind as a
teaching tool. One cannot simply negate the rhetoric of war that Nietzsche puts forth in
his later works. As a revolutionary thinker himself, the concept o f destruction as
purification ought not to be neglected. As already outlined, Nietzsche sees suffering as an
inherent value necessary to the creation of great men, and while thus far I have spoken
broadly about suffering in the most general of terms, it is important to note that there is
nothing in Nietzsche’s work that suggests that the revaluation itself will be bloodless.
Quite the contrary, images of the violent Nietzsche are scattered throughout his works,
and what he writes concerning the revaluation is no different. As he confidently
proclaims in Ecce Homo, “it is only beginning with me that the earth knows great
politics.”9 Demolishing the morality that has been thrust upon us by the priestly classes

8 While it must be conceded that Nietzsche himself argues that both elements are needed to
produce Greek tragedy - over the course o f his work Nietzsche comes to regard the Apollonian as
tangential to the weak. As one can see, the order that is presented through the Apollonian provides refuge
for the weak who are oft at the whim o f the Dionysiac rapture. While it may be the case that both elements
must exist in the world, I argue that Nietzsche makes his position known regarding which o f these elements
is inherently more fitting to the excellent man.
9 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Ecce Homo in On The Genealogy o f Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. Walter
Kaufmann and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 144.
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will not come without, as he writes in Twilight o f the Idols, philosophizing with a
hammer. We can conceptualize this type of creative destruction as Dionysiac in nature typifying the revaluation as a Dionysiac enterprise. Nietzsche’s writings concerning the
fate of his ideal future are filled with the rhetoric of raw, savage, violence; and it is
through this expression of violence as a means of purification that we see the Dionysian
festival as an expression of what Nietzsche really means when he describes the concept
of man transcending himself.
Suggesting that we can skip the step of excessive violence and massacre on the
way to great politics, as Mark Warren does in his writings on Nietzsche, fails to
recognize how important the realization of suffering is in purifying and transcending the
Nietzschean soul. I argue that part of the reason Nietzsche dislikes traditional morality
broadly is because it seeks to rein in the potential units of suffering in the world through avenues such as pity, compassion and guilt. These concepts are aimed at
controlling Dionysus, replacing his fervor and zeal with expressions of Apolline order.
Instead, Nietzsche’s tastes not only desire to negate the existing system - but accord with
the life affirming principles that he sets out throughout The Genealogy o f Morals and
Beyond Good and Evil.
Yet, while the great unlock their minds from what Nietzsche considers to be the
fictitious prison of guilt, struggle ought not to escape them. Suffering is not a concept
that is limited to the time of the revaluation - it must persist in society after we have rid
ourselves of moral concepts. How we conceive of strife and struggle in this new society
presents itself differently. As a thin constructivist, Nietzsche demonstrates through his
interpretation of cultural fluidity that we can effectually whittle moral sentiments out of
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society, through the demolition of their adherents, institutions, and dogmatic declarations.
The end goal for Nietzsche is not a society based on egalitarianism and human equality,
as these are ultimately weak.
In describing Nietzsche as a thin constructivist I mean the following: Nietzsche
emphasizes culture as an important context by which we can shape men into the
overman. Yet, the will to power is a residuum of man’s spiritedness, and Nietzsche
argues that this is an inextricable instinct accorded to man. In this way, even the culture
committed to decadence cannot entirely wipe away the longings of the will to power. For
Nietzsche, the problem with modernity is its attempt to do just this, shield the weak from
the discomfort that would necessarily be caused by subjugation to the will of the strong.
Conversely, Nietzsche argues for a culture that constructs the proper parameters, which
necessarily requires the destruction of all traditional morality. Only then will the accepted
tastes of the excellent, or nobles, in a given society be able to thrive. As one would
expect, this is a rather fleeting principle, which does not exemplify other types o f
constructivism that attempt to systematize morality by constructing steadfast accepted
upon “morals.”
The great moment in time when the excellent will overcome and transcend the old
order in favor of the new is an explicitly violent event. But, as Nietzsche demonstrates,
even in the ideal society, with ideal cultural constraints, we should not think that human
suffering is an element to be remedied. To put it more plainly, once we are free from the
guilt and other moral remnants post-revaluation, the noble sentiments still need to be
tested. While the great, in the wake of the complete holocaust of moral sentiments, may
come to the conclusion of peace as an expression of their will - this contingency only
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demonstrates a denial of systemized war, not the renunciation of violence as a response to
offense. Considering Nietzsche’s position on the importance of individual autonomy, one
can logically assume that his views toward traditional warfare in the sense o f state against
state are largely negative.10 This being said, the Nietzschean utopia post-revaluation will
not be that of true comfort and peace.
Thus, in the society to come, mankind may or may not need to have great wars to
transcend. Instead, what we will probably find ourselves left with is an honorable truce,
so to speak, amongst the excellent and based upon the chosen tastes of the nobles. Envy,
guilt and soul-sickness theoretically would die in the noble; yet, the strong would still
need to engage in envy mitigation amongst the weaker populace. We will have overcome
atavistic need to have collective groups, thus leaving us with individualistic actors who
do not feel they need to involve others in the expression of their will. The strong teach the
weak to keep their place through the instrumentality of suffering - serving as a bolster to
the pathos of distance as well.
For Nietzsche the totality of great politics cannot be realized without
extraordinary displays of violence - to both train the spirit of the noble, as well as keep
the weak from interfering with the chosen tastes of the noble. In this way, Nietzschean
excellence is underpinned by violence. The revaluation of morals, the rejection of
traditional Western moral attitudes surrounding reality and the like, cannot be expunged
from the minds of the world without great scale expressions of violence. One need only
look at Nietzsche’s admiration for the pre-Socratics to demonstrate the type o f man that
Nietzsche is looking for. His emphasis on tragic culture as a paradigm o f excellence

10
As a matter o f principle, the concept o f war necessitates that the individual conform to the will
o f some overarching objective - which in turn dampens in the individual will.
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should overtly demonstrate to readers that Nietzsche is not looking for an egalitarian
populace who respects one another on any ground other than noble excellence. For
Nietzsche, the moral free universe is not a comfortable place - and it certainly does not
resemble the types of societies we would like to see spring from secularization.
Within the vast literature on Nietzsche is the appropriation of his thought in
service of Progressive ideals.11 Namely, Mark Warren leads the academic discussion
associating Nietzsche with progressivism - and his assertions have sparked intense
debate over the legacy of Nietzsche in the modem world. I would argue that this reading
of Nietzsche is increasingly popular amongst intellectual circles who find immense utility
in Nietzsche’s critical dissection of morals and metaphysics. As a thinker often associated
with anarchism, destruction of traditional institutions and an unrepentant critical view
toward Western society, Nietzsche can be viewed as a thinker who provides insight into
philosophies that seek to revolt against existing orders. On the front of moral relativism
and the rejection of traditional moral standards, Nietzsche’s philosophy seems at home in
the extreme left —where such attitudes are generally touted. This being said, within these
share views of Nietzsche, there is overconfidence in man’s ability to treat one another
respectfully in a world entirely divorced from universal standards.
There is nothing inherent to Nietzsche’s thought that necessitates a certain kind of
treatment of human beings. Within Nietzsche’s picture of who man is, as well as his
views of the warping effects of culture, it is apparent that Nietzsche doesn’t actually

11
Part o f what makes Nietzsche as a scholar so susceptible to this range o f interpretations comes
down to his dramatic rhetoric. For more on this, Tracy B. Strong provides excellent treatment o f the
multiplicity o f interpretations in his “In Defense o f Rhetoric: Or How Hard it is to Take a Writer Seriously:
The Case o f Nietzsche,” Political Theory 41, no. 4 (August 2013).
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believe in any semblance of human equality.

12

So, in a world where universal concept of

“ought” has been replaced by the petulant philosophy of those who know, by what
standard do we judge how a human being should be treated? Throughout his work,
Nietzsche criticizes egalitarianism and democratic thinking as products of the herd. He in
no way lauds democracy as the finest achievement in human history. As John Ackerman
so aptly writes of the Nietzschean worldview, “A society in which compromise politics
i 'y

and economic processes ruled would have to be drab, dreary, repetitive and boring.”
Outside of the purview of secondary literature on Nietzsche himself, we can
utilize the discussion of Nietzschean “ends” to analyze the modem world, assessing the
legacy of Nietzsche in current political thought as a forerunner of moral relativism. In
The Closing o f the American Mind, Allan Bloom points to Nietzsche as the primary
source of moral decay in American intellectual culture.14 It is my argument that American
culture has knowingly or unknowingly, adopted Nietzschean principles through the

12 In their “Domesticating Nietzsche: A Response to Mark Warren” Ruth Abbey and Frederick
Appel highlight the oversights in Warren’s argument regarding the irreconcilability o f egalitarianism and
Nietzsche’s fear o f a culture that is leveled. Considering the attitudes Nietzsche holds toward the common,
Abbey and Appel’s argument is particularly poignant, as their discussion runs tangential to suffering as a
primary element in society to create both distance and art. For more information, see “Domesticating
Nietzsche: A Response to Mark Warren,” Political Theory 27, no. 1 (February 1999).
13 Ackerman, Robert John, Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look (Amherst: The University o f
Massachusetts Press, 1990), 112. Ackerman provides potentially the best assessment o f what Nietzschean
society would look like - had Nietzsche’s violent revaluation come to fruition. For further reading on the
ideal Nietzschean contra-Liberalism, see p. 106-121.
14 Evaluating Bloom ’s argument in regard to Nietzsche is for a different discussion than what I
would like to have here —and in an aside and self-revelatory moment, I would argue Bloom him self is only
partially right in regard to Nietzsche’s effects on modem culture because o f his Straussian perspective. That
being said, for the purposes o f this argument, Bloom’s assertions in The Closing of The American Mind are
helpful in demonstrating how American academics themselves have identified Nietzsche’s legacy in the
moral relativism o f the left. To this point, and for further reading on the subject, Jennifer RatnerRosenhagen provides an insightful extension o f Bloom ’s assertion —highlighting the legacy o f Nietzsche in
Modern America in her “Cultural Iconoclasm: The Cultural Work o f the Nietzsche Image in the TwentiethCentury America.” For more information, see Jennifer Ratner- Rosenhagen, “Conventional Iconoclasm:
The Cultural Work o f the Nietzsche Image in Twentieth-Century America,” The Journal o f American
History 93, no. 3 (December 2006).
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appropriation of moral relativism. Once we have given up serious considerations about
moral thought, we turn to things like legal structure to make proclamations about what is
actually good. Hence we see the backdrop of phrases like “X is legal so it is good” as
standardizations of our inability, or lack of desire, to discuss moral thinking in a serious
way. If we can get “the state” to say that something is legal, then the argument holds that
supposedly moral legitimacy is packaged within this legality. We want legality with the
full scope of morality - but are unwilling to seriously analyze the roots o f these moral
convictions. For various reasons, Jan Bremmer was mostly correct when he asserted,
“modem secularization has made the salvation of the soul a problem o f diminishing
importance, but the prominence in Western society of psychology shows that we still care
for our psyche, or our ‘soul.’”15
But, why precisely do we care? Once we deny the idea that human beings are
special creatures deserving of dignity, the assertion of human equality seems rather
arbitrary. Why should we mandate equality over slavery, or something in-between?
“Should” does not come out of empirical evidence, and to the extent that we want to take
the Nietzschean position and deny the idea that human beings are in fact reasoning beings
of the Platonic variety, we are essentially cut off from making explicitly moral judgments
about proper behavior. If there is nothing true about reality, and values are a result of
what we as individual societies agree upon, how do we set the standard that societies
apart from our own “should do X?” In light of this, if we take the relativistic stance that
human beings are the sum total of prior stimuli - we can’t actually get to a position
judgment. Instead what we have are our feelings and interest, which in essence have no

15 Bremmer, Jan, The Early Greek Concept o f the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1983), 3.
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objective validity and are incomprehensible from the next person who is encompassed by
an entirely different set of external inputs. Interestingly enough, despite their rejection of
moral objectivity, those who deny the universal employ the language of moral necessity.
As Hadley Arkes states in First Things:
A judgment, in turn, can issue only from a proposition - i.e., only from a
statement which affirms or denies that something is true. It is hardly
comprehensible to make a judgment (to say that one line is longer than another, or
that one public law is better than another) unless there are grounds on which to
think that the judgment is true. Still less would it make any sense to commend a
judgment to other people - to suggest that any reasonable person should favor a
certain law, say, on civil rights - unless the grounds on which the law would be
“good” were thought to be true for others as well as oneself.16
The framework of moral logic is inescapable if we want to make assertions concerning
what is right and what is wrong.
Consider for a moment the framework in which Martha Nussbaum uses to make
her argument in Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law.

It is my

argument that Nussbaum’s position borrows from Nietzschean principles, yet comes to
the ultimate conclusion that amoral man will choose those things which make him feel
good, for the greater good of humanity as a whole. To get to this conclusion, Nussbaum
evaluates shame and disgust as things that the law should mitigate, on the grounds that
these emotions make us feel bad unnecessarily. In a rather Nietzschean move, Nussbaum
denies the moral significance of these emotions, demonstrating that they are inherently
feelings associated with unjust subjugation. In this way, Nussbaum is not denying the
existence of goods in our world, she is simply selecting certain goods on the basis of how

16 Arkes, Hadley, First Things (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 4.
17 While Nussbaum uses iterations o f this framework throughout her works, I w ill focus solely on

Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law for this particular argument.
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they subjectively make us feel. In this way, the avoidance of those feelings associated
with guilt redefines the category of guilt to be synonymous with bad.
Nussbaum’s assault on guilt should provide a flash of recognition concerning the
argument at hand. Nietzsche also detested guilt because of the way it made us feel, but
his conclusion about what we should do in the wake of this feeling is starkly different.
Nietzsche, who had no reason to believe in human equality in his rejection of universal
standards, came to the ultimate conclusion that the best condition of man is hierarchical where the great dictate to the weak. Nussbaum takes the opposite approach, that in our
common weakness, the best course of action for man is to mutually agree that we would
all rather not feel bad. The apparent issue in evaluating these two responses rests in the
lack of a standard. In order to discern the viewpoint that is indeed “best,” we would need
to evoke a standard, which we have denied ourselves access to by virtue of our
relativism.
It is Nussbaum’s position that we should not feel guilt. Disgust and shame are
functions of a fictitious and faulty system, traditional morality. Moral education as we
know it is in need of a moral re-education. There is nothing existentially or morally true
about our beliefs, and to the extent that we attempt to teach right and wrong, we ought to
take into account the way our judgments make other people feel. To this point, as she
writes: “beliefs taught early in life become deeply habitual, and unlearning them requires
a patient effort of attention and self-transformation.”1 The ways in which this sentence
alone accords with Nietzschean principles are vast; yet, the most important and vital to
our discussion here is the idea that beliefs are merely matters of habit. Down to her

18
Nussbaum, Martha C., Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 35.
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verbiage, Nussbaum’s critique of moral beliefs drips with Nietzschean sounding prose.
“Self-transformation” is a quintessential Nietzschean concept. The idea that man can
transcend his own being is central to the will to power. The problem with Nussbaum’s
assessment of moral-revaluation is that there is nothing in her theory that suggests that
people, post-overthrow of morality, will select the nice approach. Nietzsche’s response to
such an appropriation would certainly be negative, and it is my argument that Nussbaum
has no legitimate reason to argue that human beings should not suffer.
In order for man to realize the totality of life without reason or God, he must
come to terms with the fact that what we’ve once understood to be the right way to live is
a farce. Nietzsche forces readers to come to terms with the fundamental question
pervasive in his work: why be good? It is in Nietzsche’s breathtaking critique on modem
society that we see his eerily accurate summary of the problem with liberalism. If we are
to accept that God is dead and reason is powerless as a guide, what grounds do we have
to suppose that man will continue to act “nicely” toward one another? For Nietzsche, the
claims of the modem decadent are simply the after effects of a toxic herd morality that
has yet to be purged. If we are to regain our greatness, and thus maintain that which is
truly instinctive in us, we must embrace the blond beast. Anything less would be an
offense to our authenticity as agents of chaos and creation.
It is with great emphasis that I utilize the word purge, as that is precisely what I
take Nietzsche to intend when he discusses revaluation of morality. It is my argument
that Nietzsche’s revaluation must entail violence, and a great deal of it. Man must be
made to suffer - it is only the decadent who seeks to reverse this principle. Nietzsche’s
intent is to entirely rearrange the structure of our societies in a way that supports the
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spiritedness of the strong. In order to understand the ways in which we affect this change,
we must come to understand the true nature of Nietzschean man - an endeavor which the
first chapter covers. Nietzschean man is amoral, and in terms of structure, if we want to
create higher men, we must encourage strength. To do this, we must deny the effeminate
search for truth in favor of the manly expressions of honor. It is this cultural change that
encompasses my second chapter.
As Nietzsche argues, the culture of the ancients was the most excellent, and if we
are to understand excellent man, we must understand excellent art. In this way, Nietzsche
provides us with Greek tragedy as an exemplar of what the excellent culture must be. The
hero of Greek tragedy provides us with the image of the higher men - who endure their
sufferings with great joy in the face of the nihilism. Man must invoke the Dionysiac in
order to fully complete this prophesy. My third chapter will merge the primary goal of the
previous chapters, demonstrating how modem liberalism has accepted Nietzsche’s stance
on relativism, but has maintained the desire of the herd to be comfortable. Utilizing the
thought of Martha Nussbaum I will demonstrate how the modem liberal lacks a basis to
reject the violence of the Nietzschean man.
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to take the problem of human suffering
seriously. If we lose the belief in ungrounded liberalism, what is left but the nihilistic
option? Man is thus lost, and does not know how to deal with his suffering in an entirely
secular view. If we deny the suppositions grounded in natural law, all modem hedonistic
or utility theories can tell us is “don’t suffer,” or that we should feel pleasure. Nietzsche
answers this question in the body of his work, building a secular case for the good of
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suffering. Inadvertently, Nietzsche tells us something crucial about the necessity of the
theological understanding of man as a justification for human dignity and equality.
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Chapter 1
Nietzschean Man
Who once wore chains, will always think, that he is followed by their clink.
— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy necessitates we suffer - as suffering is the
vehicle by which we understand ourselves and our own self-made reality. Nietzsche’s
assertions concerning the nature of man are particularly interesting - as man is inherently
instinctive, but relies on a culture to allow the full realization of these instincts. Given
this, we see Nietzsche’s concept of the revaluation as crucial to an understanding of
human potential. We can either construct a culture that supports human excellence, or we
can construct a culture that panders to the weak precepts of the herd morality. Human
beings, in Nietzsche’s view, are agents of chaos. By this I mean amoral, irrational,
disorderly, spirited and appetitive creatures who seek to exert power over the world. We
are both vehicles and instruments of suffering, and our nature lends itself to this assertion.
Driven by the will to power, Nietzsche argues that man is a lover of vitality and
affirmation of life; we are the origins of both creation and destruction. Our thirst for
power makes us inherently hierarchical - some of us are stronger, in both spirited and
physical brawn, than others. Because of this, we ought to view the world around us, and
our fellow man, in a distinct light.
Suffering provides a context by which we can evaluate the station o f man more
readily. Nietzsche’s man must endure suffering to achieve greatness; yet, reject the idea
that equal results are produced through this suffering. Given his view of man, suffering is
a vehicle that provides meaning to life in a secular world, while doing so in different
ways for different kinds of people. The operative concept in the context of this discussion

is bound in the struggle. Great men endure, weak men perish. Nietzsche’s theory of man
relies on suffering as a component of human existence that must always be present.
Without a true understanding of the struggle in both the abstract and concrete, we cease
to produce great men.
This chapter will illustrate Nietzsche’s view of human nature as it developed over
the course of his work. Primarily, I will explore the foundational assumptions of
Nietzsche’s thought via a careful examination of the ways in which his theory is
illustrative of soullessness with soulfulness. To do this I will first explore Nietzsche’s
theory of man through a comparison to that of Plato. I will highlight the ways in which
Nietzsche’s theory is demonstrative of a starkly different universe as compared to
Platonic reality. The second half of this chapter will focus on culture — exploring the
importance of first and second nature in relation to the blond beast and traditional
morality. I will highlight the construct of the blond beast as demonstrative of the
Nietzschean ideal, underscoring the ways in which Nietzsche’s own descriptions of
revaluation are underpinned by violence and bloodshed, committed by individuals who
view no such moral standard barring them from action. I will conclude the chapter with a
discussion of the weak in this regard, pointing out potential avenues in which human
suffering serves as an important and necessary aspect of Nietzsche’s thought —an aspect
that interpretations of Nietzsche’s work often ignore.

Plato and Socrates: Founders o f Western Philosophy
In the spirit of Nietzsche’s own methodology of opposition, and given that he
himself was such a staunch critic of Plato, it is fitting to discuss Nietzsche’s view of the
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human person in contrast to Plato.1Nietzsche considers Plato to be the father of the weak,
the philosopher par excellence of the herd. For Nietzsche, Christianity is simply an
iteration of Platonism, repackaged under the symbol of Christ crucified. For this primary
reason, I will combine Christianity and Platonism, as Nietzsche did throughout his works,
as demonstrative of a similar ultimate goal. This goal surrounds life in accordance with a
value that is not altogether obvious, an ideational reality that exerts control over man via
his soul. The Platonic soul drives Platonic philosophy, and it is through this construct that
we can examine the opposition that is so often highlighted between Nietzsche and Plato.
Before delving into the elemental aspects of Plato’s tripartite theory of the human soul,
and how the soul should be rightly ordered, I will focus the beginning of my discussion
on what Socrates says in Phaedo concerning the soul.
Within the Platonic view, suffering man has the potential for solace. While man
may be unable to completely remove suffering, there are ways in which we can order
ourselves to make such suffering slightly more comprehensible, and thus easier to endure.
Man is a soul possessing creature, something that makes him inherently equal by virtue
of this soul. Additionally, man’s actions are in accordance with an ultimate good that
either enriches or damages his soul. To put it another way, our actions accord with a view
of justice that deems cruel treatment as unbefitting to the human station. In this way we
mediate suffering by disallowing certain kinds of behavior by virtue o f our humanity.
This argument stems from a position of universality. The human is a special kind of soulpossessing creature, and because of this, we are going to respect standards that flow from
this fact.

1
For more on Nietzsche’s view o f Plato, see Werner J. Dannhauser’s Nietzsche’s View of Socrates
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974).
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For Plato, the eternal soul is prior to, and separate from, our physical bodies.
Body and soul are two distinct, yet related, concepts. The soul encompasses the realm of
the unseen, and the body encompasses the realm of the visible and worldly. Thus, the
soul is a unitary, and purposive, concept that directs and orders the body accordingly. In
his discussion with Simmias and Cebes, Socrates describes the soul as that element
within us containing wisdom:
Then if we obtained it [the soul] before our birth, and kept hold of it when we
were bom, we had knowledge, both before and at the moment of birth, not only of
what’s actually equal, or greater or smaller, but of all such things. Our present
argument applies no more to equality itself than it does to beauty itself, or
goodness, justice, holiness...2
Rightly understood, the soul controls the body, not the other way around. The soul
possesses the knowledge of what is right - or in Platonic terminology, the Good.
Consider the concept of the Divided Line in light of this discussion. Cognition of
our universe is divided into two categories - the Good and the sun, whereby the Good is
demonstrative of ideational reality (those things which we cannot physically touch), and
the sun is demonstrative of physical reality. Knowledge is thus encompassed by the
Good; as soul possessing creatures we can access objective universals which found the
Good, the true and the beautiful. As demonstrated prior, the soul can accord with the
good, in turn rationally ordering those things around us.
He who listens to the wisdom of the soul is practicing that which will prepare him
for death, as the physical body is finite. Yet, the soul is eternal. “The soul, the invisible
part, which goes away to a place that is, like itself, glorious, pure and invisible —the true
2 Plato, Phaedo in The Last Days o f Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, trans. Hugh
Tredennick and Harold Tarrant (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 141.
3 The concept o f the Divided Line is a conceptualization o f Plato’s epistemology as presented in
Books VI - VIII o f The Republic.
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Hades or unseen world.”4 This tension between the physical and invisible realm creates a
context by which man must rely on his knowledge to discern right and proper behavior
and conduct. The idea of a soul that can be smudged in the process holds man to his
behavior in a profound way.
Additionally, the mention of equality in the above quote is important to focus on.
Possessing a soul is a necessarily egalitarian concept; to put it another way, one either
possesses a soul, or they do not. It is illogical to conceive of man having only part of a
soul, he either has one or he does not. Plato’s argument is that we do all have souls. The
disparities among us that arise in terms of qualitatively different souls stem instead from
the ways in which we enrich this soul. This point brings us to Plato’s discussion o f man
in light of this soul, through his description of the tripartite theory - man is comprised of
reason, spirit and appetite.
Appetite is perhaps the easiest element to explain within the context of the
Platonic worldview, it encompasses our physical urges to attain, consume and indulge.
Appetites relate to our physical body, and we can vividly illustrate the concept of the
appetite as our belly.5 Given unlimited latitude, the appetite will continue to pursue the
end goal of satiating desires; or, to use the example mentioned prior, to fill the belly.6 In
this way, appetite alone gives us no such standard by which to judge our urges
qualitatively.

“Thirst in itself wants neither much nor little, good nor bad, not any

4 Plato, Phaedo, 148.
5 C.S. Lewis describes the appetites as such in The Abolition o f Man —providing us with the
description o f the appetite as the belly, the spirit as the chest, and reason as the head. For more on this see
The Abolition o f Man (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 24.
6 It should also be noted here that the appetite is not strictly limited to the analogy o f belly and
literal hunger, we can also conceptualized the appetite as desires for sexual pleasure as w ell - thus
encompassing not only belly but loins.
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particular kind of drink. It simply wants to drink.”7 There is nothing intrinsic to the
appetite that inhibits us from indulgence, and to the extent that we are true to our
appetites, we satiate them on a basis of desire. Claiming one appetite is better or more
excellent than another involves attributing a scale of value that is not native to the belly.
Consider Simon Blackburn’s commentary in Plato’s Republic, “what desires and
passions cannot be is true or false, and it is the providence of reason to distinguish truth
and falsity.”8 To put it another way, the appetite and all desiring aspects of our being say
“I want,” not “I ought.”
Yet, as Socrates suggests throughout the Platonic dialogues, the concept of
“ought” provides us with insight into the life well lived, applying a standard by which we
can judge the rightness of appetitive desires. Plato argues that this control o f our appetites
stems from something that stands above our mere desires. This is described as reason, the
second element of the human soul. As a certain kind of being, a reasoning being,
pursuing appetites above all things is not what is “best for us,” or fitting to our station. In
light of our reason, we ought to control our appetites as a parent controls the appetites of
a child. We know what is good for us, and we assuage our desires to the extent that it
does not make us sick.9 In his discussion with Glaucon in Book IV of The Republic,
Socrates discusses the interplay between restraint and indulgence of appetite, utilizing the
example of thirst:

7 Plato, The Republic, trans. Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 1996), 133.
8 Blackburn, Simon, P lato’s Republic: A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007),
74.
9
Keep in mind the story that Plato wants to tell concerning the health o f the soul - the rightly
ordered soul is the healthy soul, whereas the soul that follows interest alone is sick.
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A thirsty man, insofar as he is only thirsty, desires only to drink...But if a thirsty
man refrains from drinking, it must be due to a part of him different from the
thirsty part that pulls every animal to water....There must be something else that
bids them to abstain, something that overpowers and inhibits the initial urge.10
Humankind possesses an appetite, just as animals do; but, their ability to inhibit this
seemingly automatic instinct suggests something more is at play. In this way, man’s
capacity for self-control distinguishes him from the mere animal. Whereby animals live
and die by the will of the appetite and appetite alone, human beings possess a depth of
existence that goes beyond this appetite. This is what embodies Plato’s view o f the
reasoning element of man.
Plato argues that the action of restraint is a response to something other, or
higher. In describing our capacity to deny ourselves, Socrates suggests that there is
something within us that is, “different from the thirsty part that pulls every animal to
water.” We are distinct in this regard from animals, our capacity for restraint separates us
from the animalistic model of the pursuit of appetite; we can reason about the rightness of
our desires, and make choices in light of this reason. “What is the inhibiting agent? Is it
not reason and reflection?”11 According to Socrates’ argument, we make the choice to
inhibit ourselves on the basis of what we know to be good for us - we deny irrational
drives in the name of reason. Human beings, given their station, are capable o f an
inwardness that animals do not possess, and their ability to choose “I ought” in the face
of “I want” demonstrates a depth of capability and insight.
The third element to be discussed in light of Plato’s theory is that of spirit —our
sense of honor and sentimentality that allows us to feel things like anger or disgust. There

10 Plato, The Republic, 133.
11 Ibid., 133.
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is an interesting connection between honor and truth that is worth describing briefly.
Honor presents to man something similar to truth, and at many points honor bolsters the
cause of truth in a positive way. This being said, honor can also hinder truth by providing
an appealing simulacrum that is actually furthest from the truth. Things like loyalty to
affiliation are good examples of how honor presents itself as a “friend” o f truth, but can
be warped into its biggest enemy. Consider the following passage in light o f this
distinction from The Republic:
One day Leontius, son of Aglaion, was coming up from Piraeus alongside the
north wall when he saw some dead bodies fallen at the hand of the executioner.
He felt the urge to look at them; at the same time he was disgusted with himself
and his morbid curiosity, hand he turned away. For a while he was in inner
turmoil, resisting his craving to look and covering his eyes. But finally he was
overcome by his desire to see. He opened his eyes wide and ran up to the corpses,
cursing his own vision. “Now have your way, damn you. Go ahead and feast at
this banquet for sordid appetites.”
Leontius recognizes his morbid curiosity as something inherently wrong, he is disgusted
by this curiosity because of the nature of the scene. His own desires to look repulse him.
Rationally, Leontius knows he should control this desire to look and continue walking;
yet, his morbid curiosity appeals to his appetite in an attempt to draw his attention. In this
scenario, the element of reason is at war with the appetite, or passions.
The spirited element reveals itself in Leontius anger - he gives in to his passions,
but he does not feel good about this decision. In the story, Socrates highlights that he was
“overcome by his desire,” demonstrating that his ability to rationally control his desire
was imperfect. Leontius damns his appetites as he views the bodies, acknowledging the
breakdown of such self-control as bad. The result of this breakdown is shame and anger.
Leontius has given in to his passions in light of what he knows to be bad, and his spirited

12 Ibid., 134.
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element psychologically punishes him. “We often see this kind of behavior where a
man’s desires overmaster his reason. This results in his reproaching himself for tolerating
the violence going on within himself.”13 While Leontius’ desires have won the battle
against his reason in this instance, the demonstration of his disgust does show, when
properly accorded with reason, the spirited element can rein in the desires.
Consider the context of suffering within this particular example. Leontius has
committed a wrong by giving in to his morbid appetite. While Socrates clearly outlines
that Leontius feels anger, it is important to define what function this serves in the broader
sense. More specifically, what Leontius is experiencing here is anger stemming from
guilt. His spirited element clues him in to the fact that he ought to feel bad for engaging
in such behaviors, he has gone against his reason and feels bad for it. While a more
thorough treatment of this relationship will be discussed in the next chapter, it is
important to note guilt and suffering in the Platonic view.
Additionally, when Plato discusses the spirited element of man, he highlights
those sentiments we often associate with reputation or pride. Honor bound sentiments, as
Plato demonstrates, resemble truth, and yet stand as the furthest thing from it. The honor
bound man looks down upon the appetites as beneath him, but at times also dismisses
knowledge as beneath him. “And what about the lover of honor? Does he not disdain the
pleasures that money buys as vulgar and beneath his station. As for the pleasure that
knowledge brings, he dismisses it all as hot air and nonsense if no sort of honor or
distinction is attached to it.”14

13 Ibid., 134.
14 Ibid., 272.
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It is important to note the place of spirit rightly understood - in accordance with
reason against the passions. In this way, we must be mindful of things that can corrupt the
spirit for Plato. Because of this, it is important to reinforce the place of reason in relation
to the spirit:
It is proper that the reasoning element should rule because it is wise and capable
of foresight in planning for the whole. It is clearly appropriate that the spirited
element should be the servant and ally of reason....When reason and spirit have
been trained to understand their proper functions, they must aid each other to
govern the appetites that constitute in each of us the largest and most insatiate part
of our nature. 5
As Socrates explains, we must be trained to feel things like anger or disgust at the
appropriate times, rendering the properly trained spirit an asset to reason.
Think here of the things we do to maintain our reputation, in spite of what we
know to be true. In this way, it is important to include pride and hubris as iterations o f the
spirited element. As C.S. Lewis so aptly put it in The Abolition o f Man, “As the king
governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the
‘spirited element.’ The head rules the belly through the chest - the seat...of emotions
organized by trained habit into stable sentiments.”16
In light of the Platonic soul, and these three elements, we can make the following
conclusions concerning Platonic epistemology - knowledge itself is a reflection of the
Good. As human souls entrusted with the capacity of reason, we create a context by
which we can make judgments, or speak of “ought” as a quantity that must be considered
if one wants to live the “good” life. As the charioteer of reason controls the horses of
desire and appetite in Phaedrus, so too must we order ourselves and our universe in light

15 Ibid., 137.
16 Lewis, Abolition o f Man, 24.
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of this knowledge of the Good. 7 Through the proper arrangements of our universe we
experience justice, and in turn, happiness. For Plato, appetite is bestial and animalistic,
and ought to be controlled by reason accompanied by properly trained spirit. To the
extent that our appetites are not controlled, they silence reason and produce injustice. In a
similar fashion, the passions of the spirit, such as pursuit of honor and valor, deaden our
senses to the truth.
Happiness is also framed by such a view of order, and it is Plato’s argument that
the relationship between this ordered justice and happiness is directly relational. To
further underscore the distinctions between rational order and happiness in Platonic
thought, we can turn to the “cracked jars” example that was presented by Socrates in
Gorgias:
Now one man, having filled up his jars, doesn’t pour anything into them and gives
them no further thought. He can relax over them. As for the other one, he too has
resources that can be procured, though with difficulty, but his containers are leaky
and rotten. He’s forced to keep on filling them, day and night, or else he suffers
extreme pain.1
Within this example, the man with the intact jar is the self-controlled, just and orderly
man, whereas the man with the cracked jar is appetitive and disorderly. Whereby the selfcontrolled man is content, his appetitive counterpart must continually dedicate his life to
the pursuit of resources that ultimately continue flowing through the jar. Because material
resources are fleeting, particularly in a cracked jar, they can never bring any sort of
existential contentment. This vicious cycle consumes the man with the cracked jar, as the
pursuit of that which satiates him becomes his primary occupation. Thus, the man who

17 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 22-28.
18 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), 67.
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lives by the maxim “I want” chains himself to such a life. As a result, he can never
experience the happiness that the man with the filled jar feels.
We can summarize this entire discussion concerning Plato with the following,
because of the very particular picture Plato paints concerning the Good in relation to the
human soul, the rationally ordered universe makes perfect sense. This turn to reason is
precisely what Nietzsche dislikes. For Nietzsche, it is this shift that is an expression of
weakness. Rather than face the harsh reality of our existence, Nietzsche views the
Platonic grab for reason as bom of a decrepit will to decline. Platonism provides order in
which the weak can hide from their sufferings. Expressions of equality, the Good, and
reason all demonstrate a refuge from the rather unforgiving physical world. These
constructs which we cannot physically touch demonstrate an attempt to draw man out of
his instinctive nature for another purpose.

Nietzsche’s Man
The basic precepts of the Platonic worldview outlined, we can now turn to the
Nietzschean man. The stark differences between the two ought to give us pause, as
Nietzsche’s man comprehends his being and his universe as entirely different. In this
section, I will distinguish Nietzsche’s viewpoint in opposition to Plato, paying special
attention to the composite picture of Nietzsche’s man. Utilizing an explanation of
Nietzsche’s interpretation of the soul, I will reconstruct Nietzschean moral theory as a
causal model for our world.
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In order to capture the essence of Nietzschean man, we must look to what he calls
the “pre-moral period of mankind.”19 This is of primary significance when it comes to
distinguishing the Platonic from the Nietzschean, as Nietzsche conceptualizes the human
soul in entirely different terms. As Jan Brenner writes in The Early Greek Concept o f the
Soul, prior to systemized and analytical thought regarding the soul, ancient peoples
conceived of the soul as dualistic, there was “a free soul representing the individual
personality [psyche] and the body souls endowing the body with life and consciousness
[thymos, noos and menos\ .”

Brenner continues to add that early Greek writings

concerning the soul suggested that it was the part of the soul associated with our psyche,
the free soul, which persisted in an afterlife.21 The conceptualization of the soul as the
animating factor of mankind is important to highlight within the context of pre-Socratic
thought:
Soul, whether it was associated with breath, blood, or spinal fluid, was universally
regarded as the source of consciousness and life. A man is alive, he can move his
limbs and so move other things; if he faints, it means that his soul has withdrawn
or become incapacitated; if he dies, it becomes permanently so, and the “soul”
that goes squeaking down to Hades in Homer is a mere shadow, because it is
dissociated from the body and can no longer produce life and movement.22
Coupled with this, and the most important distinction from a Nietzschean perspective,
pre-Socratic man did not conceive of his actions within the purview of an explicitly moral
universe - “in Homer’s time the individual did not yet know of the will as an ethical
19 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f the Future, trans.
Walter Kaufrnann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 44.
20 Bremmer, Jan, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1983), 13.
21 Ibid., 12.
22 G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection o f
Texts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 95.
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factor, nor did ne distinguish between what was inside and outside himself as we do.”
Therefore, despite the persistence of the psyche in Hades for example, man functioned
without deference to objective universals. We can view this as an illustration o f what
Nietzsche means when he is discussing the soul - it should be noted here that Nietzsche,
as a matter of rhetorical significance, relies on the term “spirit” to discuss this concept.
Within this pre-moral universe, we see entirely different perspectives on causation
and purpose. Man’s spirit, or his soul, is what animates him in the most basic sense; his
desires are thus an extension of this spiritedness in an abstract way. Given this
interpretation, Plato’s version of the soul becomes practically incomprehensible within
the Nietzschean cosmos. If the soul does not have any connection to a moral universe, but
instead is merely an animating factor and extension of his will, concepts relating to a
rational moral order become meaningless and arbitrary impositions originating from
some men to constrain others.
In keeping with his revaluation, Nietzsche makes it clear in Ecce Homo that the
West has built its foundational assumptions concerning the human person on a
meaningless premise. Those things we often associate with the “Good,” are in fact
directly tied to faulty cosmology that wishes to rein in what was once great about the preSocratic spirit. “What mankind has so far considered seriously have not even been
realities but mere imaginings - strictly speaking, lies prompted by the bad instincts of
sick natures that were harmful in the most profound sense - all these concepts, ‘God,’

23 Bremmer, Early Greek Concept o f the Soul, 67.
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‘soul,’ ‘virtue,’ ‘sin’...”24 Thus, the Platonic spirit for Nietzsche is one that falsifies
reality by chaining it to a concept that is inherently spirit-deadening.
By this I mean, the following: Platonic philosophy dictates that the spirit accord
with reason. As evidenced by the internal struggle Leontius endures as he unsuccessfully
resists the temptation to view the corpses, Plato would argue that man must control his
spirit to accord with what he knows to be right or wrong. Otherwise, he runs the risk of
feeling guilt, disgust and shame. Nietzsche would disagree with this, as he accepts that
the mere presence of a desire is its own justification. For Nietzsche, man’s spirit must be
unbridled, and suggesting man feel guilty for endeavoring in things that are wrong
universally is imposing a standard upon man that Nietzsche would outright reject.
Nietzsche’s philosophy lends itself to a kind of constructivism. Once we begin
imposing certain standards on man, we begin to change his perceptions o f reality. Within
a Nietzschean constructivist framework, the danger in Platonic philosophy is the idea that
there is a true world that sits outside of our apparent view. The cascade o f things that
come along with this view, the Platonic soul, the idea of the Good and the like are
directed toward reason, in the pursuit of the realization of this true unseen world.
Platonic reason makes certain acts morally unthinkable, and man inevitably becomes
weaker in the process. Among the many Platonic constructs that are negated under
Nietzsche’s revaluation of the soul, the compartmentalization of the real and apparent
world becomes blurred. For Nietzsche, the idea that there is a higher purpose outside of
the apparent world is inherently harmful:
Suppose nothing else were “given” as real except our world o f desires and
passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other “reality” besides the
24 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Ecce Homo in On The Genealogy o f Morals and Ecce Homo ed. Walter
Kaufmann and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 256.
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reality of our drives - for thinking is merely a relation of these drives to each
other...a more primitive form of the world of affects in which everything still lies
contained in a powerful unity before it undergoes ramifications and developments
in the organic process (and, as is only fair also becomes tenderer and weaker) - as
a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions are still synthetically
intertwined along with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion and
metabolism - as a pre-form of life.25
Nietzsche clearly argues that Platonism is effectually a veil of sorts, directing our
“instinctive life” to take on a meaning that is not natural to it. Nietzsche maintains that
our instinctive life is inherent to our being, but those semblances we place over our
instinctive life are significant, as they can fundamentally change man’s nature.
What composes the “real” world Nietzsche references in this passage are all of
those elements that refer to universal truth. A rationally ordered universe necessarily
needs a reality by which it can function. It is only through an understanding of the Good
that we can discern iterations of the forms in the world around us. A better way to
demonstrate this concept is through the following example: consider you are sitting with
at a table with a group of people - someone at the table, with an intent to trick the group
poses the question, “do you hear that?” After describing the noise to the group, members
begin thinking they hear said noise - when in fact, there was never a noise to hear in the
first place. Within the context of this anecdotal example, the noise that we the outside
third party know to be fictitious, becomes part of reality for this group. This is precisely
how Nietzsche views morality in context of society, thus making its products part of this
fictitious exercise.
For Nietzsche, what is real is that which we can touch, a world we filter through
our spirited will and the cultural artifacts we inhabit. Nietzsche himself is a lover of life
and vitality, of the spiritedness that finds its beginning in the illustrations of the pre25 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 48.
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Socratic soul. ‘The only world is the one in which we are living, here and now, with all
its change, paradox, and impermanence. The ‘other world’ is a fiction, an illusion, which
has no existence outside the sick imaginations of decadents and intellectual cripples.”
The will to power is what functions in this world of “now,” and we must pay special
attention to the wellsprings that feed this spiritedness.
We can turn the discussion to the elemental aspects that comprise Plato’s theory
of the human person and apply them to Nietzsche. Beginning with appetite, it is
important to note the similarities between both Plato and Nietzsche when it comes to the
nature of appetite and its place within the context of their respective theories. Both
thinkers view the appetite as animalistic and bestial; yet, whereas Plato views appetite as
the silencer of reason, Nietzsche takes a dualistic approach. While we cannot entirely
remove the appetitive aspects of man, it is necessary to allow him to engage in the
passions of the appetite occasionally. Overindulgence in the appetite can blunt all that is
excellent about nobility. In this way, life is not always the Dionysian festival of
destruction and merriment.
We can further divide the element of appetite into two primary categories:
pleasure and interest. For Nietzsche, those things which relate to appetitive pleasure have
a time horizon of concrete immediacy. People who are after these sorts of things are in it
for the drugs, sex and alcohol, so to speak. The elements of appetitive pleasure are
Dionysian in nature - we are forgetting our self-consciousness and giving in to bodily
release. While Nietzsche seems to disdain the characters who do nothing more with their
lives, it is important to recognize that on some level, Nietzsche sees engagement with
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these activities as a necessary release from the pragmatic Apolline restraints of everyday
life.
Alternatively, we have the appetitive interest, which is rather Apolline in nature.
Interest differs from pleasure in significant ways, and for Nietzsche interest is a tool of
the weak. In the consideration of time horizons, interest is calculating; and, he who acts
in his interest is attempting to make himself comfortable in the long term. Interest lends
itself to utility, and among the many evils that interest is guilty of, Nietzsche finds most
disdainful the weakness associated with interest. Comfort is the calling card of interest,
and to the extent we are trying to make people comfortable, we are peddling sniveling
weakness.
The man driven by interest does not want to suffer, he looks to the future in an
attempt to create a state in which he will not need to suffer. Those who seek to fill their
belly and persist in a state of comfort are what Nietzsche describes as the common, their
aspirations are lowly, and Nietzsche likens them to animals. In this way, the appetitive
man of either case, pleasure or interest, does not transcend the station of animal. “As long
as anyone desires life as he desires happiness he has not yet raised his eyes above the
horizon of animal, for he only desires more consciously what the animal seeks through
blind impulse.”27 In order to rise above the station of animal, man must suffer, he cannot
continually search for that which makes him comfortable. In order to break from the
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restraints of “animal,” he must endeavor in the Dionysiac, which provides painful insight
into the harsh reality that we are in fact “straying through an infinite nothing.”28
Nietzsche assaults the appetitive man as weak, and those who cater to the
appetitive as common in their own right. One need only to look to the first essay of The
Genealogy o/Morals to find Nietzsche’s revealing commentary on the utilitarian mindset
- “they are simply old, cold, and tedious frogs, creeping around men and into men as if in
their proper element, that is, in a swamp.”29 It is clear throughout his work that Nietzsche
has no use for those who seek happiness through the appetite. Additionally, consider
Nietzsche’s critique of capitalistic society and a culture of consumption:
In former times one looked down with honest nobility on people who dealt in
money and business, even though one had need of them; one admitted to oneself
that every society had to have intestines. Now, as the most covetous of its regions,
they are the ruling power in the soul of modem humanity.30
Nietzsche bemoans modem society as an expression of the ever-expanding appetite, and
the continued search to satiate its bottomless desires. For the spirited and honor-bound
philosophy of Nietzsche, the pleasures of overindulgent appetite are vulgar.
For Nietzsche, the concept of reason is particularly challenging. As he does not
actually believe in a true reality, he interprets reason to be entirely different from the
Platonic view. For Nietzsche, reason is what we use to disclose our will and desire to the
world; we use it to describe our inner life honestly or deceptively. There is nothing
transformative about reason within this view, because there is nothing objective that we
28 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science: with a prelude in rhymes and an appendix o f songs,
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 181.
29 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals in On The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. Walter
Kaufmann and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 24-25.
30 Nietzsche, Friedrich, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” in Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel
Breazeale and trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 219.
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can “know” in this absolute sense. Consider the following, “Nietzsche suggests over
again, in a wide variety of ways, that values are not objective, are to be understood in
terms of the persons who hold them, cannot be supported by facts or sound reasoning, or
are created rather than discovered.”31 By contrast, if we want to say that something is true
in a Platonic sense, we are essentially defending an objective principle. Platonic reason is
transformative because it orders the self. In a reality where there are objective truths, we
can say that we know something to be universally true. The Platonic self is reasoning
about what is universally right and wrong, restraining those things which it views to be
bad, or even evil. Within the Nietzschean context, this entire exercise is an exercise in
futility - what adherents of Platonism are essentially doing is laying claim to a faculty
that has no such access. In other words, in order to claim that there is Platonic truth, you
have to believe in the Good. Because Nietzsche denies the principle that any objective
good or evil exists, Platonic reason cannot exist.
In the modem world, claims to rational order absent a conception o f the Good
persist. For Nietzsche, expressions like those often found amongst Enlightenment
thinkers attempting to construct a rational order, are iterations of decaying Platonism.
Consider “Kant’s Joke” in this context, attempts to maintain reason in truth through
elaborate mechanisms like categorical imperatives are simply endeavors in unnecessary
mental exercise: “Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the common
man, that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of this soul. He wrote
against the scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the
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people.”32 It is out of weakness that man seeks such certainty - and as Laurence Lampert
identifies in Nietzsche and Modern Times, “need drives most to retain the old Christian
beliefs.”33 This weakness is directly related to a resistance to suffering. Because of their
desire for comfortable certainties, Nietzsche accuses Platonism, Christianity, Kant and
his decadent adherents, of weakness.
Nietzsche’s account of the origins of truth help us understand what he considers
the weakness of morality. In The Genealogy o f Morals, Nietzsche describes the origins of
our moral sentiments as stemming from the sick soul of the weak, or the herd. It is
Nietzsche’s identification of the rhetorical change from “good and bad,” to “good and
evil” which is of particular significance to this discussion. Once we begin to appropriate a
language to discuss matters associated with the concept “evil,” we are by default
appealing to the standards set forth by the weak. Evil is a metaphysical concept
incomprehensible to those who negate the concept of truth. Through the invention of a
category that draws from evil, Nietzsche concludes that the weak have effectually blunted
what is truly good about man - his free spirit:
The symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all human history,
is “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome”: there has hitherto been no greater
event than this struggle, this question, this deadly contradiction. Rome felt the
Jew to be something like anti-nature itself, its antipodal monstrosity as it were: in
Rome, the Jew stood “convicted of hatred for the whole human race”; and rightly,
provided one has right to link the salvation and future of the human race with the
unconditional dominance of aristocratic values, Roman values.34

32 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 205-206.
33 Lampert, Laurence, Nietzsche and Modern Times: A study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 331.
34 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 52-53.
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Herd morality and Platonism skew our view of the horizon; where we once had concepts
of good and bad that originated from the noble tastes and aristocratic sentiments of
distance and distinction, we are introduced to a new realm: evil. In the realm of good and
evil, human beings accord with the design of the universe, which acts upon them. For
Nietzsche, this bastardization of the true world is exceptionally egregious, as it convinces
people to accord with a standard that denies chaos, disorder and wild expression of the
spirit. In turn, it denies suffering.
This link is important, particularly as it relates to the soul. For Nietzsche, the
tripartite soul as described in Platonism, and later Christianity, is but one element of the
truth theory that seeks to restrict the noble in favor of the weak. As one might expect, the
denial of the Platonic soul, or “soul superstition” as Nietzsche calls it in Beyond Good
and Evil, comes with significant ramifications. Most obviously, the concept of rational
order is called into question. The Platonic soul must be ordered properly to be able to
demonstrate that which is good. Furthermore, there is an inherent equality in the concept
of soul-possession. As a matter of principle, those who adhere to the soul superstition by
and large recognize this quality of human beings as a leveling agent. While we may have
gradations of virtue, the soul is a fixed constant. We recognize this in one another, thus
founding the potentiality for arguments concerning the equality of the human person. It is
precisely this claim which Nietzsche rejects wholeheartedly. Consider Nietzsche’s
assertion on the doctrine of equality in Twilight o f the Idols, “‘Equality for the equal,
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inequality for the unequal,’ - this is what justice would really say: along with its
corollary, ‘never make the unequal equal.’”35
Given Nietzsche’s disgust for what he claims is the origin of truth-arguments, it is
clear to see precisely why, and on what grounds, he would reject its function in the world
around us. Nietzsche’s critique of Western philosophy stems from the appropriation of
truth as the anchoring point of our principles. The history of truth has been the history of
truth acting upon the human condition, imposing its will. In the preface to Beyond Good
and Evil, Nietzsche tellingly poses the following question to his readers, “Supposing truth
is a woman - what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers,
insofar as they were dogmatists, have been inexpert about women?”

It should not go

unnoticed that Nietzsche’s tone in relation to this concept is already set by his analogy of
truth as a woman - Nietzsche himself did not appear to hold a particularly high vision of
women, broadly speaking.

Within the context of this specific quote we see Nietzsche

demonstrating an important precondition of philosophy - where we are concerned with
the element of truth, certain things are removed from the realm of critical inquiry.
Truth is bom of weakness, and supports weakness in societies that choose to
appropriate its foundational assumptions. Therefore we can discern two fronts on which
Nietzsche assaults truth - its origin and its effects, which we can distinguish as reason.

35 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Twilight o f the Idols in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight o f the
Idols and Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (N ew York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 222.
36 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 1.
37 While not within the scope o f this particular project - it is worth pointing this fact out as
anecdotal evidence suggesting Nietzsche’s position on the concept o f truth. It is my conviction that one
ought to read this line in the same spirit one reads Machiavelli’s proclamation that “fortune is a woman” in
The Prince - as I suspect both authors intend for it to be taken in a specific, and similar, light.
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Turning our attention to effects more fully, it is helpful to utilize Tracy Strong’s analysis
of Nietzsche in light of truth.38 Strong asserts that truth within Nietzschean philosophy is
treated in a dualistic manner. We effectually have the negation of historical truth, in turn
revealing that there is nothing discoverable that is not “human-all-too-human.”

Within

the context of historical truths, Nietzsche makes evident that it is the spirit o f the age, and
not reason, that dictates what is true. Within this context we can assume that truth is
arbitrarily dictated by the chosen tastes of the noble - and as easily as it was pointed out
it can change. When we assume that there are historical truths that can be discovered, we
close the door on our capacity to question certain things. As Strong writes:
There are, for Nietzsche, no necessary and permanent characteristics o f a socalled human condition. His view of the world permits the possibility o f humans
“agreeing”: on what is true at any given historical period. However by making the
link between unquestioned statements and moral statements essentially
psychological...the investigation and disclosure of the basic presuppositions
current at any particular time will only be impeded by the people involved having
unconscious reasons which ensure the sanctity of the presuppositions.40
Truth effects the conclusions we draw from our perceptions, what we typify as reason in
the Platonic sense is for Nietzsche a falsification of existence.
In Anti-Christ, Nietzsche boldly asserts that, “reason makes us falsify the
testimony of the senses?” 41 Reason makes us question our feelings or our spiritedness,
and looks to rationalize and calculate based upon what can be drawn from (imagined)
universals like the Good. Reason makes us falsify the testimony of the senses by
381 would argue that in the vast expanse o f secondary literature on Nietzschean epistem ology and
the like, Tracy Strong provides the most insightful treatment o f what truth is in the context o f irrationalism.
39 Strong, Tracy B., Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f Transfiguration (Los Angeles:
University o f California Press, 1988), 39.
40 Ibid., 27.
41 Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Idols, 167-168.
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attributing a source to our desires that is not in fact there. Nietzsche, in turn, focuses on
interpretation of objects and action to demonstrate our ability to enact our will upon our
own context, making semblance an important thing to consider. Note the emphasis
Nietzsche places on myth and depictions of the gods; these stories are important in
demonstrating our will.42 The understanding of “good” and “bad” in Nietzsche’s universe
is in direct opposition to the Platonic universe. “What is good? — Everything that
enhances people’s feeling of power, will to power, and power itself. What is bad? Everything stemming from weakness. What is happiness? - The feeling that power is
growing, that some resistance has been overcome.”43
Nietzsche’s assault on reason demonstrates distaste for the constant and
unchanging, as universal standards necessarily require that our picture of the world
remain chained to concepts of the Good and the like. Stability and uniformity itself are
offenses to Nietzsche’s view of man, as it necessitates that we consult a standard prior to
action. Coupled with its intent to order the universe, reason necessarily requires that man
order himself to the same standards. It is this order which offends Nietzsche’s
sensibilities and penchant for individualism and the will to power. In light of these
factors, Nietzschean reason ultimately becomes the extension of the will to power.
Rightly understood, reason is an instrument of public self-disclosure. Instead of
according our conclusions about the universe with objective standards, our reason acts

42 While a further treatment o f the relationship between semblance and reality will be utilized in
the next chapter, it is important to recognize that Nietzsche’s selection o f myth and tragedy is incredibly
particular - and important to his overall world view as contra-Plato.
43 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Anti-Christ in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight o f the Idols and
Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman and trans. Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 4.
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upon the cosmos, shaping the world to accord with our will. To put it another way, the
world is but a blank canvas to project the creations of the will to power.
Reason is to Plato as spiritedness is to Nietzsche - an analogy that elucidates both
Nietzsche’s disdain for reason as well as his respect for spiritedness. It is on the grounds
of spirit that we can discern the excellent from the common, giving depth of meaning to
Nietzsche’s view of equality, or rather inequality, in this light. It is important to keep this
in mind for later discussion, as Nietzsche’s view of the human person is certainly one that
stands in stark opposition to egalitarianism. For those who appropriate Nietzsche as a
progressive thinker as Mark Warren does, one questions how this particular point is
reconciled with a world view that necessitates we have some foundational basis in
equality. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s view also demonstrates a particular view of human
treatment that is silent on considerations of ethical or humane treatment. We can assume
from the totality of his theory in this regard that Nietzsche himself would disagree that
there is a fundamental quality about human beings that is necessarily deserving o f a
particular kind of decent treatment.
Nietzsche’s view of spiritedness should remind us of Plato’s honor-bound man —
he does not deign to be controlled by his appetites, and he does not see truth as the
motivator for his actions. Harvey Mansfield aptly associates the Nietzschean spirit with
manliness, “True manliness in Nietzsche’s famous account (in the Genealogy o f Morals)
survives and absorbs the unmanliness of the slave.”44 This connection is rather fitting
concerning Nietzsche’s worldview. What we want is manly strength in the form o f
healthy spiritedness, courage and brawn. What we don’t want is feminine weakness that

44 Mansfield, Harvey C., Manliness (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006), 115.
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looks for order or structure. We can draw a distinction here between strong and weak that
Nietzsche so often highlights.
Nietzsche measures the worth of humanity in relation to will. Strong willed
individuals exercise power over the world, those possessed by weakness do not. These
opposing forces, when they area free from the yoke of reason, bring out those elements
within people that define their station. To put it another way, the universe is comprised of
individual wills, some stronger than others. The will to power is the driving force of
humanity. Human beings desire to realize their power as the most fundamental,
instinctive quality of their existence:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the
development and ramification of one basic form of the will - namely, o f the will
to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced
back to this will to power and could also find in it the solution o f the problem of
procreation and nourishment - it is one problem - then one would have gained the
right to determine all efficient force univocally as - will to power. The world
view from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible
character” - it would be “will to power” and nothing else.45
Those strong spirits are able to extend their will more aptly than those who are weak, and
through this relationship we discern the pathos o f distance. Because o f the spirited
element of man, and Nietzsche’s assessment of their virtues, man must necessarily be a
hierarchical creature.
The noble spirit is the spirit of strength. We can associate the noble spirit with
Nietzsche’s coinage of “yes-saying.” What this means in the concrete is more obscure,
but it can be defined as the following, yes-saying is the realization of one’s desires and
acting upon them in a way that demonstrates their strength and vitality. Given that
Nietzsche admired the noble classes so, we can view the noble sentiments in this regard
45 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 48.
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as those things which Nietzsche attributes to healthy spiritedness. It is Nietzsche’s
argument that, absent moral sentiments like guilt and pity, the great will behave in a way
that acts solely on what his will dictates. Nietzsche looks to the ancients as a paradigm of
excellence because of the way in which their societies remained unsullied from the stain
of Platonism. “For the Romans were the strong and noble, and nobody stronger and
nobler has yet existed on earth or ever been dreamed of.”46 As originators of good, we
can look to the spirit of the strong to see precisely what Nietzsche intends when he
discusses the health of the spirit.
The spirit of the noble values begins with Nietzsche’s discussion of the blond
beast in Genealogy. Far from peaceful and orderly, to the adherent of Platonic thought,
Nietzsche’s noble soul stems from a quasi-animalistic pursuit of desire - where we see
man being described as simultaneously great, and beast. The hero of the pre-moral age
exercises his will upon the world and its inhabitants as he sees fit:
Human beings whose nature was still natural, barbarians in every terrible sense of
the word, men of prey who were still in possession of unbroken strength of will
and lust for power, hurled themselves upon weaker, more civilized, more peaceful
races, perhaps traders or cattle raisers, or upon mellow old cultures whose last
vitality was even then flaring up in splendid fireworks of spirit and corruption. In
the beginning, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their predominance
did not lie mainly in physical strength but in strength of the soul - they were more
whole human beings, which also means, at every level, “more whole beasts.”47
Nietzsche’s deliberate characterization of the beast in this view serves a dual purpose. As
the creators of value, the strong are those who must destroy to create. Such men are men
of prey; suggesting that those who are imposed upon will suffer rightly as a mere fact of
life, to the degree that there are such facts.
46 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 53.
47 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 201.
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Nietzsche’s intent with the discussion of the blond beast should not escape readers
looking for a definitive declaration of the Nietzschean spirit. Given the historical tale that
he tells in relation to traditional morality and master/slave morality, the emphasis on
precisely who creates our values has significant ramifications for the health of the spirit.
As Nietzsche writes, “while every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation
of itself, slave morality from the outset says no to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’
what is ‘not itself.’”48 Because of the root of good in the noble and “good” themselves,
Nietzsche distinguishes the importance for the spirit to accord with the principles set
forth in noble values. These values springs from the same instinctive nature of man that
brought about the blond beast, providing for an interesting foundation to begin talking
about values:
The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need
approval; it judges, “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself’ ; it knows itself to
be that which accords honor to things, it is value creating. Everything it knows as
part of itself it honors; such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there
are feelings of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow. 49
In this way, the legacy of the blond beast lingers in the tenets of master morality —we
cannot escape from the inherent violence in its precepts, nor can we look at fellow human
begins as equal, given the pathos of distance created by the noble/common distinction.
Because of this, within the purview of Nietzsche’s theory of man, many things that would
be considered objectively bad from a Platonic standpoint become thinkable, or more
poignantly, become qualitatively good: “I will teach men the meaning of their existence —
the overman, the lightening out of the dark cloud of man. I am still far from them, and my

48 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 36.
49 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 205.
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sense does not speak to their senses. To men I am still the mean between a fool and a
corpse.”50 Thee future-orientation of this passage implies a degree of violence that is
telling.
The beast of prey does not concern himself with the feelings of those who come
to ruin at the extension of his will. If the will to power is the measure of all things - what
man needs is a spirited appetite which feeds off a desire to say yes to oneself. Throughout
his work, Nietzsche utilizes this construct to demonstrate the things that contribute to a
healthy spirit. Again, we see contrast to Plato in this regard, as it is Nietzsche’s argument
that the sick souled Platonist demonstrates a clear no-saying to oneself through denial of
the passions in favor of an outside force, or other will.
The true, excellent, Nietzschean spirit is the disciple of Dionysius, and this
spiritedness is not tied to any universal standard of what is good and what is bad. This
being said, life for Nietzsche is not continually the festival of Dionysian ecstasy one
might think it is. Some passions are not fit to order one’s life around. Consider the
argument Strong provides in light of this - every age has agreed upon principles, dictated
by the noble, concerning what proper tastes are. Consider the term value in this context,
for Nietzsche this term has a very specific and purposeful meaning. While the
appropriation of “values” in modem culture has come to mean some ambiguous mix of
ethics and feelings, Nietzsche intended the term “value” to coincide directly with what
the noble takes to be worthy of being “valued.” Because the noble classes are those that
create value, the term “value” is meant to be relative, connected to a specific time and
place. We must balance these accepted tastes and values with an affirmation o f life.

50 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: The Modem Library, 1995), 20.
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Consider what the Platonic response in light of this discussion. What Nietzsche argues
Plato (and Christianity later) is up to is the ultimate expression of a hatred for life and all
of the things associated with spiritedness and vitality:
I want to speak to the despisers of the body. I would not have them learn and
teach differently, but merely say farewell to their own bodies - and thus become
silent. “Body am I, and soul” - thus speaks the child...but the awakened and
knowing say: body am I entirely and nothing else; and soul is only a word for
something about the body.51
Free of the chains of moral concepts, man will act on his love of life, creating value in
those things which accord with his tastes.
What Platonism effectually does to the spirit is bog it down with feelings of guilt,
feelings which are not innate or natural to its being. The will to power cannot exist within
the same universe as moral universals; and, it is vitally important that the noble spirit
remain untouched from the specter of the Good, for he might begin to question the
rightness of his behavior against a standard that is not his own. What the strong and
excellent must be are identified by Nietzsche as, “triumphant monsters, who perhaps
walk away from a disgusting succession of murder, arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated
and undisturbed of soul, as if it were no more than a students’ prank.”52 The spiritedness
of the good, or the noble in this particular context, must coincide with happiness. The
noble actor engaging in his will to power is an individual who conceives o f himself and
his existence in the universe as bom of chance. His spirit is free to relinquish his
consciousness to the unexpected experience of life lived with glory. The experience of
such a character is that of great joy, stemming from his ability to engage in the art of his
existence as he sees fit. Strength of spirit for Nietzsche relates directly to desires rightly
51 Ibid., 34.
52 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 40.
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understood - for the purposes of clarity we can identify this as psyches that are
unpolluted with bad conscience, pity and other effects of the slave morality that have
crept into the minds of men.

The Warping Effects o f Culture
Given this snapshot of man, we can now turn to an assessment o f culture. For
Nietzsche, culture is of utmost importance because of the way in which it orders the
actions and sentiments of men. To the extent that we take our position on reality from our
culture, as Nietzsche suggests we do, culture is the only way in which we can curb our
perceptions of reality to accord with a view of the excellent man. In spite of our instincts,
or tendency to desire the realization of our will to power, Nietzsche concedes that our
inputs play a crucial role in our potential. In this way, man (broadly speaking) is
equipped with the proper tools (instincts) to drive human excellence (fine displays o f our
will to power); yet, culture (inputs) plays a role by giving us the psychological latitude to
advance our will to power. Nietzsche is at the very least a thin constructivist. It is
important to recognize this fact in relation to his view of ordered societies and a
revaluation of morals. His entire project rests on the premise that man’s nature is
changeable, and that the proper societal constraints can create a context by which our
moral sentiments can finally die away.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes man in the following way: “Man
is a rope, tied between beast and overman - a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a
dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and
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stopping.”53 At the face of it, this passage sums up everything Nietzsche thinks about the
nature of man in light of culture. Given the proper context and foundation, we can raise
up the overman from the masses of beasts. All approaches in this light certainly are not
equal, and we must pay attention to the wisdom of the noble instincts to construct a
universe in which we unlock this human potential.
Considering the discussion of the Nietzschean cosmos, it is clear that Western
philosophy has not lived up to Nietzsche’s standards - in fact, with its roots in Platonism
it has gone against the grain of our instincts in the name of order and reason. The history
of Western philosophy, as Nietzsche argues throughout his works, is demonstrative o f the
negation of our desires in a sick asceticism. Recall the earlier mention of inputs, in this
way, man is only partially driven by context. It is this fact that must be pointed out, our
spiritedness longs to be released from the constraints of order and reason. The ache in the
mind that is produced by this fact grounds Nietzsche’s entire purpose for writing; among
those excellent enough to feel the pull of these desires, Nietzsche finds a sympathetic
audience. It is this rejection and binding of great spiritedness that leads to Nietzsche’s
critique of modernity, and potential remedies. Such a remedy would not be possible if
one were to conceive of man as fundamentally changed by the inputs of Platonic thought.
Yet, we have to simultaneously balance this claim with Nietzsche’s rejection o f a stable
human nature. As the work of an intensely skeptical and perspectival mind, grand
declarations of what human nature is necessarily illustrates deference to a standard which
Nietzsche would disagree with. The instinctive drive toward free-spiritedness
This statement may seem at odds with the discussion thus far - but if you
conceive as human beings as instinctive, what we consider to be our nature is simply a
53 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 13.
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veil placed over instincts. Recalling the discussion of causation prior, “nature” thus
understood becomes the interpretation of the instincts. We erroneously place meaning
and significance on primal functions of the appetite, in turn, declaring things o f instinct to
be encompassed broadly by our “nature.”
Instead, what we as philosophers must do is recognize the error in accepting what
has been thrust upon us by morality, and actively utilize this knowledge to reframe our
culture and unchain the spirit. This interconnected nature of man, history and morality
shapes the way we view ourselves, and to the extent that we prefer one historical
“species” over another, we are hindering our own human development.54 Consider the
following passage in light of this discussion:
For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of
their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible
wholly to free oneself from this chain. If we condemn these aberrations and
regard ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact that we originate in
them. The best we can do is confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our
knowledge, through a new, stem discipline combat our inborn heritage and
implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first
nature withers away...But here and there a victory is nonetheless achieved, and for
the combatants, for those who employ critical history for the sake o f life, there is
even a noteworthy consolation: that of knowing that this first nature was once a
second nature and that every victorious second nature will become a first.55
Inputs, or culture, express control over our instincts, to a point. It is important to note
Nietzsche thinks that we are capable of “condemning these aberrations o f the past” as
well as “confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge,” which speaks
to the importance of instincts discussed thus far.

54 More specifically, Nietzsche discusses the relationships, or approaches, to history extensively in
the second section o f “On the Uses and Disadvantages o f History for Life” in Untimely Meditations ed.
Daniel Breazeale and trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 66-77.
Through the discussion o f the monumental, antiquarian and critical “species” o f history, Nietzsche
describes each in relation to the “man o f deeds” - Nietzsche’s view o f the excellence.
55 Nietzsche, “Uses and Disadvantages o f History,” 67.
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This duality in the discussion of human nature is important in identifying man as
an amoral creature. As Nietzsche writes, there is nothing objectively correct about our
“first nature” - and to the extent that we remain chained to the “aberrations, passions, and
errors” of previous generations, we are withholding the possibility of human excellence.
It is also worth noting the rhetorical significance of the words Nietzsche uses to describe
the past in this passage. Here, the first nature Nietzsche describes is what we have been
raised to believe, a direct reference to the concept of morality as it has been propagated in
the West. Yet, as Nietzsche writes, “this first nature was once a second nature,” which
draws readers’ attention to Nietzsche’s own considerations concerning human nature.
While nature is fluid, man is necessarily amoral at his core, and attempts to transgress
upon this throughout the course of history have been aberrations. This first nature, so to
speak, is not naturally our first nature, to the extent that we even possess a nature to begin
with. He goes on to say, “every victorious second nature will become a first.” Through
cultural changes we can create different men.

Weakness and the Last Man
Nietzsche’s disgust for the last man is among the many factors that motivate his
work. Realizing the propensity in modem culture for decadence and comfort, Nietzsche
correctly identifies a crisis in Western culture - the loss of authenticity and will to
decline. In light of the loosely understood “nature of man,” we come to view the last man
and overman as opposite ends of man’s potential. Given the proper set of cultural
standards, Nietzsche argues that we can create excellence or the common. The last man is
linked to the weakness of the slave classes, and the overman is linked to the excellence of
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the nobility and the blond beast.56 Because of these relationships, we can trace the
genealogy of the last man to the weakness bom of the slave classes, enhanced through the
dogma of the church, and perpetuated in faint images by the entirely secularized
utilitarianism.
Stemming from the inherent weakness of the slave classes, traditional morality
has blossomed and infected even those “secular” philosophies with the herd mentality.
The relationship between Nietzsche’s hierarchy of man and suffering is directly related.
Through suffering we are able to realize the strength of man’s spirit. It is through this
oppositional force of strife that we underscore man’s differences: noble and common,
excellent and lowly, strong and weak. The weak endure their sufferings with ressentiment
and envy for the noble, who endure strife and tribulation jubilantly. Their eyes sick with
envy, the weak view their sufferings as injustice, and in their hatred of the strong, the
weak priest enters Nietzsche’s Genealogy.
In identifying Nietzsche’s view of man, it is important to clarify what constitutes
the low, as well as the high. As stated prior, Nietzsche sees a definite inequality amongst
men. His view necessitates a hierarchy in which the superior exercise their will over the
weak. It is important to note that the weak are not without their instincts - men are equal
in the sense that they have this capacity, yet they are unequal in the “health” o f this
capacity. The best way to typify the strong and weak in this regard is through the
relationships of health - keeping in mind that this descriptor of health and man in
Nietzschean thought relates to both physical and spirited strength. As explained prior, the
strong are the healthy; so, the weak in the Nietzschean universe are the sick. They

56
Lampert, Laurence, Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation o f Thus Spoke Zarathustra (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 19860, 24.
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embody everything demented, ill, sickly, poisonous and deadly. They present a problem
to the concept of the affirmation of life, as their weakness disallows them from such
pleasures. They are brooding and common, and not without their envy and hatred of the
strong. In turn, they look to rational order in attempts to chain the greatness o f the strong,
protecting themselves from the will of the blond beast. In this way, all that is
encompassed by the Platonic is an exemplar of weakness, and thus sickness.
Yet, Nietzsche recognizes the relative success of this endeavor of the weak, “that
revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see
because it - has been victorious.”

The weak, in their pathetic state, harnessed their own

instinctive drive toward the will to power by constructing a reality that would chain the
mind of the noble. The weak, upon accepting their relative physical weakness compared
to the masters, compensated for their weakness via cunning and trickery. Nietzsche is
clear that those who believe in the concepts set forth by Platonic and Christian ideals are
weak, small, helpless and pitiful creatures - yet, potentially the most important descriptor
of all, they are sick. In this way, the priestly classes, although weak, were successful in
applying a second nature to the noble classes, in the form of slave morality.
Weakness cannot be life-affirming. In turn, all of the herd morality, as a product
of the weak, is explicitly life-denying. Throughout his work, Nietzsche holds a special
contempt for the weak and priestly classes. His reference to them as the herd draws
attention from readers, as he often compares such people to farm animals and the like.
Given the parameters of master morality, the weak in the pre-moral universe embodied
the distinction of “bad;” yet, with the success of the slave revolt, an important rhetorical
change occurs: we introduce the concept of evil. “The concept of the ‘soul,’ the “spirit,”
57 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 34.
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finally even ‘immortal soul’ invented in order to despise the body, to make it sick, ‘holy’;
co

to oppose with a ghastly levity everything that deserves to be taken seriously.”

The

introduction of evil presented an ideational reality to the universe that necessarily
required an appeal to the objective, which Nietzsche views as contrary to the nature of
man.
According to Nietzsche, the idea of needing a divine to validate existence, to act
as judge, demonstrates a deficiency in spirit, a sickness.59 We turn to religion to
supplement for our own shortcomings, when we cannot say “yes” to ourselves, we must
hide our shortcomings. The invention of religion in this regard is particularly helpful as a
convenient remedy to such weakness. “For every religion was bom out of fear and need,
it has crept into existence along paths of aberrations of reason.”60
Ultimately, this “fear” stems from the suffering-inscribed memory of the actions
of the blond beast, who utilizes the weak as the audience to his will. “Christianity wants
to rule over beasts o f prey; its method is to make them sick, - weakening is the Christian
recipe for domesticization, for ‘civilization.’”61 The weak, who are incapable of realizing
the fullness of their will to power, construct civilization in light of their timid values.
What have become central to Western philosophy are the concepts of orderliness, self-

58 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 334.
59 Laurence Lampert elaborates upon this point in Nietzsche in Modern Times, where he adds,
“B elief denotes a deficiency o f will; and will, as the affect or phenomenal component o f command is the
decisive sign o f sovereignty or might.” p. 331. Nietzsche in Modern Times: A Study o f Bacon, Descartes,
and Nietzsche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
60 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R.J. Hollingdale
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 62.
61 Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 19.
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control and reason - direct oppositions to what Nietzsche considers to be fitting and
proper for human beings: virtues of strength, mastery, and self-disclosure.
The last man is a product of this evasion of suffering. The rational order
constructed to provide solace to the weak has created a time ready for, “the most
despicable man.”62 It is this weakness that Nietzsche finds most despicable, as the last
man is the paradigm of decadence. Man has atrophied under the yoke of Platonism
leaving vestigial creatures, animals who resemble man in appearance but lack
authenticity and vitality. Despite attempts to secularize, a society that remains tethered to
the herd morality is destined for the age of the last men:
“What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?” thus asks the
last man, and he blinks. The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man,
who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last
man lives the longest. “We have invented happiness,” say the last men, and they
blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to love, for one needs
warmth...One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful
lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both
require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too
much exertion. No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody
is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.63
Faced with Nietzschean reality - amoral reality - man can choose to maintain the old
order and structure of meaningless niceties and propensity toward human dignity', or, man
can choose to turn away from the yoke of the true toward that which affirms life.
Nietzsche would argue the only solution to the age of the last man is the embrace o f a
culture that denies and deconstructs this rational order, removing the constraints that
provided them comfort and protection from struggle. In order to combat the last men,
man broadly must endure struggle.
62 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 17.
63 Ibid., 17-18.

57

Elaborating upon this point, John Richardson examines the place of human
suffering in relation to value in Nietzsche’s System. Richardson focuses on Nietzsche’s
theory of hierarchical man to demonstrate that suffering combats nihilism by dividing
man into categories of excellent and herd. If man chooses not to organize in this way, and
maintains the will to decline through an egalitarian view of man, we will trend toward the
society of last men:
In the society of ‘complete nihilism’, egalitarian tendencies will have quite
prevailed, eliminating classes, and generally leveling social and economic
differences between persons. This condition is reached by unstinting application
of the principle (to put the point in more recent terms) of benefiting first and
worst off. Our society, and even all the world, is progressively organized toward
the end that there shall be no worst off. So its resources are turned increasingly to
eliminate suffering.64
Arguably, the age of the last men is upon us. The modem world, and its penchant for
comfort, has systematized the herd morality in its pursuit of those things which fill the
appetite and deaden the spirit. Modem man does not want to suffer, and seeks solace in
the products of decadence, namely fictions of human equality. To the extent that we
accept the Platonic man, we reject the premise that all men are deserving o f a certain kind
of treatment. The West embarked upon an interesting endeavor in this regard, rejecting
God while simultaneously rejecting suffering. Nietzsche acutely felt this presence as he
wrote, and I would argue that modem society is an example of precisely what he
mourned in his works. Decadence and comfort have prevailed; yet, Nietzsche provides
readers with a remedy to this state of affairs: in the form of tragic culture.

Conclusion

64 Richardson, John, Nietzsche 's System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 166.
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The general structure of Nietzsche’s argument lends itself to a view of man that is
in need of the proper context to pursue his will to power. Nietzsche’s man is starkly
different than that of his perceived intellectual enemy: Plato. Through Nietzsche’s careful
rejection of truth, we see Nietzschean man as ordered first by spirit - then by reason and
appetite. To utilize the illustration put forth by C.S. Lewis, we can interpret Nietzschean
man as ordering his head and belly through the sentiments of his chest. Reason gets reappropriated to demonstrate the tastes of the chest, which are fleeting at best.

It is

through this chest-first view, we see Nietzsche’s argument for the health o f the spirit in
the master morality.
Given this, Nietzsche maintains that the instinctive drives raging in both the blond
beast and the sickly priest is illustrative of an important point - we do not rid ourselves of
our longings for the will to power. Instead, we veil them. In the modem world, we
identify these longings by other names; yet, as Nietzsche argues, the modem malaise is a
function of this deadening of the senses - for some of us realize this veil, and look to
remove it. Because of our societal entrenchment in Platonism, Nietzsche argues we must
bring back the elements of culture that once supported the instincts, and allowed us to
satiate this need.
Confronting this problem head on necessarily requires we examine human
suffering more deeply. In the pursuit of human excellence, we see suffering, or the relief
of our suffering, as a function of herd morality that expresses itself rather declaratively in
the modem age. Comfort and decadence mark the culture of modernity, and while we
constantly view the march of progress as a net good in the respects of curing these units
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of suffering, Nietzsche would argue we are causing widespread decay to the spirit o f
humankind.
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Chapter 2
Meaning and Suffering in the Greek Tragedy
How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire
horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?
Whither is it moving now? Wither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we
not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there
still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we
not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night
continually closing in on us?
—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

Nietzsche recognizes that nihilism presents a fundamental problem to humankind.
Absent rational or divine purpose, man experiences a loss of meaning —the trials and
tribulations that face mankind are no longer conceived of as part of a larger plan. Instead,
man in the society where God is dead recognizes the edge of the abyss, or the
nothingness beyond life here on earth. How we endure under those circumstances is of
utmost importance for Nietzsche; and given his disdain for nihilism, we are left to
identify meaning through creation. In other words, we must create a new meaning to prop
up our existence. In this way, we are creatures that need such meaning; yet, not all
wellsprings that attribute meaning are worthy of man. Instead, Nietzsche offers Greek
tragedy and tragic culture as a mechanism by which man can realize meaning, absent
God. Art in this way is the vehicle by which we create truth, and subsequently meaning.
Greek tragedy is significant for Nietzsche’s purposes, as it provides a context by which
we can view a universe unchained from the yoke of the herd. The hero of Greek tragedy
emerges throughout Nietzsche’s work as the individual who endures suffering, and
transcends - or gains the ability, through suffering, to realize his excellence.

Within this context, the tragic context, there must be heroes and weaklings,
victims and perpetrators, excellent and lowly. Tragic culture is necessarily anti
egalitarian, and Nietzsche seems to suggest that the role of the heroic is not accessible to
all people. Instead, what the great art of tragic culture was successful in doing was
creating distance, or bolstering the pathos o f distance. This form of art did not attempt to
create replications of the common, but rather displayed Nietzsche’s ideal: the hero.
Nietzsche’s conceptualization of Greek tragedy is analogous with the ideal, and it is
through this offering of tragic culture that we see Nietzsche’s remedy for the sickness of
modernity, or as he identifies it, Platonic thought.
It is in this spirit that one ought to view The Birth o f Tragedy — as one of
Nietzsche’s most joyful and jubilant works, expressing nostalgia toward the age past.
Tragic culture made for societies in which man looked to art for the creation of meaning,
as opposed to rigid avenues like Platonic reason. The creative oppositional forces of
Apollo and Dionysus act outside of moral constraints, and their ability to provide man
with dreamlike semblance, as well as raptured intoxication, demonstrates something
about Nietzsche’s view of how man ought to relate to his world. Man is innately chaotic.
While we may need our moments of Apolline order, we also need our moments of
intoxicated destruction and release of our passions. Coupled with this, man is amoral —
perhaps even immoral, neither the Apolline nor Dionysiac are demonstrative of a moral
standard in any concrete way.
Despite the fact that Nietzsche’s work evolved substantially over the course of his
life, one cannot ignore his earliest work as a solid foundation for his subsequent works. I
argue that Birth o f Tragedy provides readers with a snapshot of the most salient features
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of what would come to be in the whole of his work - starting with an examination of
Apollo and Dionysus and ending with his critique of Socrates. It is in the pre-Socratic art
form of tragedy that Nietzsche sees the excellent, and through a careful examination of
the elements of man, we can reasonably assert that the pre-moral universe is an excellent
paradigm by which we can draw certain conclusions about how our societies ought to be
ordered. As a byproduct of this pre-moral universe, Nietzsche’s identification of Greek
tragedy exemplifies Nietzsche’s own recognition of a fundamental aspect o f his
philosophy. Without great suffering, we will not have excellent men. More than just a
treatise on art, Nietzsche’s work in Birth o f Tragedy is an expository piece demonstrating
Nietzsche’s views on knowledge and the treatment of man. It is through great suffering
that we impart knowledge, about ourselves and, more specifically, our station.
However, Nietzsche scholars generally ignore Birth o f Tragedy. I would argue
this is mainly due to the contradictory nature of what his intent truly was with the balance
of Apollo and Dionysus. Throughout Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche seems to oscillate
between arguing that both Apollo and Dionysus are needed for great art, and favoring
Dionysus. While I will explore this at greater length later, it is important to distinguish
here that this potential contradiction is of little significance. The difference here comes
down to the fact that Apollo is not a character that is seeking to impose a moral standard.
His illusionary semblance does create order, but Nietzsche himself asserts that one does
not look to the Olympians for an expression of a moral standard in this way. Therefore,
Apollo and Dionysus are not exemplars of a moral paradigm in the way we typically
understand it.1

1
For more on this point see p. 65 o f M.S. Silk and J.P. Stem’s Nietzsche on Tragedy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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In Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche criticized his own work, suggesting his approach to
be “badly written, clumsy, embarrassing.”2 Yet, what Nietzsche does say in Birth o f
Tragedy is helpful in discerning the Nietzschean worldview as one that emphasizes the
importance of suffering. Nietzsche’s admiration for tragic culture in his early works
defines what would later come in the works he published prior to his leave from
intellectual life. In the suffering of the tragic man as presented in Birth o f Tragedy, there
is immense foreshadowing to the rhetoric of violence present in Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo
and Twilight o f the Idols. Through great suffering we can transcend, or overcome, the
order that has been thrust upon us, reuniting with our instinctive and authentic selves. It
is my argument that while Nietzsche declaratively states in Birth o f Tragedy the need for
Apollonian and Dionysian fusion in great art, his later works tend to favor the Dionysian
- eclipsing the ordering principles of the Apollonian. Through the appropriation of
Dionysus as his patron saint, it is my argument that Nietzsche outwardly accepts the need
for massive scale suffering in order to recapture the pre-moral universe.
This chapter will demonstrate the ways in which Birth o f Tragedy is
demonstrative of Nietzschean metaphysics through aesthetics. By this I mean to show the
distinct connection between Nietzsche’s views on the creation of reality and the creation
of art. We create great art through the creative forces of Dionysian destruction and
Apolline dream; in turn, we can recapture tragic culture and appropriate these creative
forces once more to destroy the moral standards of the herd and appropriate our own
Apolline semblance of nobility and good taste. First, I will provide a discussion o f the
elemental aspects of Greek tragedy, highlighting the function of the Apolline and
2
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth o f Tragedy in The Birth o f Tragedy and Other Writings, ed.
Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs and trans. Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 5.
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Dionysiac in the creation of great art. Within this discussion, I will demonstrate the
relationship between great art and great men as an exercise in enduring struggle and
strife, providing a comprehensive tragic worldview. I will evaluate the place of the tragic
hero, demonstrating the importance of Dionysus in both suffering and transcendence.
Finally, I will conclude this chapter with Nietzsche’s discussion of the theoretical
worldview —ushered in through an attempt to understand the world, and thus understand
the meaning of suffering.

Apollo and Dionysus: Art in Response to Nihilism
Nietzsche’s theory of aesthetics as presented in Birth o f Tragedy provides the
context by which we can discern Nietzsche’s view of irrationalism. Faced with the reality
of nihilism, man becomes the total measure of the universe. The artist, like the noble, is
the creator of value - and it is important to recognize the fact that in the Nietzschean
cosmos, aesthetics are effectually an expression of metaphysics, or a kind o f value theory.
For Nietzsche, the value created by noble peoples is all we have, and to the extent that we
are creating “great” art, we are doing so in accordance with the agreed upon tastes of
those who set the standard. We can place the artist in the same category as the noble in
this regard, demonstrating a level of complexity to Birth o f Tragedy that is not altogether
evident in a superficial reading of the piece. It is through this view that we can evaluate
Nietzsche’s philosophy of art born o f struggle as implicating human excellence. In this
analogy, art is comparable to man. To the extent that we are creating greatness on either
front, we are necessitating the concept of suffering as a transformative element.
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To begin, we can evaluate the place of suffering in the pre-moral universe by
demonstrating the context by which Nietzsche thinks great art was conceived —through
the expression and interplay of Dionysiac and Apolline drives. For all the romanticism
and nostalgia Nietzsche places on the man of the pre-moral universe, nowhere does
Nietzsche suggest that the ancient man lived a life that was free from suffering. In fact, as
the basis for his inquiry in Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche outlines that it was the harsh
reality of existence that drove men to the creation of gods and semblance in the first
■j

place: to deal with the “terrors and horrors of existence.” Nietzsche argues that man
needed dream and semblance to tolerate his such a life. As he writes, “our innermost
being, the deep ground common to all our lives, experiences the state of dreaming with
profound pleasure and joyous necessity.” 4 To put it another way - man needs his dreams;
hence, we need Apollo. Through the Apolline, man is able to escape his reality and find
refuge in semblance. Additionally, it is through Apollo that Nietzsche contends man finds
his trust in order and restraint; protected by the principium individuationis, “Apollo is the
most sublime expression of imperturbable trust in this principle of the calm sitting-there
of the person trapped within it.”5 It is through Apollo that man consoles himself, guarded
from the harsh reality in which he lives through invented structures bom of rational
inquiry.
This being said, there are breakdowns in these moments of Apolline protection —
where the Dionysiac element destroys the neat semblance that is created through Apolline
dream, or principium individuationis. It is through the Dionysiac elements that man
3 Ibid., 23.
4 Ibid., 16.
5 Ibid., 17.
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transcends this Apolline order, becoming the physical realization of his passions and
desires. Associated with intoxication, Dionysiac elements bring one to moments of
forgetting oneself and delving into the passions:
There now sounds out from within man something supernatural: he feels himself
to be a god, he himself now moves in such ecstasy and sublimity as once he saw
the gods move in his dreams. Man is no longer an artist, he has become a work of
art: all nature’s artistic power reveals itself here, amidst shivers o f intoxication, to
the highest, most blissful satisfaction of primordial unity.6
This primordial unity is an important piece of the Dionysiac effect. The creative elements
associated with Dionysus are those which allow man to indulge his basic instincts and
enter unity with the real world. The Dionysian festival is one of indulgence, intoxication,
destruction, and simultaneously creation.
It is this distinction that sets Dionysus apart from Apollo, creation is thus a
Dionysiac enterprise. Where Apollo maintains, Dionysus effects change. It is in this way
that we come to understand Dionysus as the god of the revaluation — or, the set of
creative elements that allow man to experience authenticity once more by destroying the
standards that deny him from experiencing primordial unity. Dionysus does not
perpetuate the Apollonian order of the everyday, he instead deconstructs it in his utter
disregard for it. Whereas Apollo governs that which is associated with restraint and
contemplative detachment, Dionysus is associated with those things that allow us to
reengage with the real world. Peter Berkowitz’ description of the two in Nietzsche: Ethics
o f an Immoralist, is quite fitting, “Whereas Apollo is, so to speak, all thought and no

6 Ibid., 18.
7 Dionysus effects change, but it is also important to note that this change is entirely devoid o f a
moral understanding. There is nothing in Nietzsche’s philosophy that is suggestive o f Dionysiac change
resulting in a kind and happy world. Instead, we are dealing with change in the simplest o f terms.

67

action, Dionysus is all action and no thought.”8 The one requires the other, but the Greeks
erred by effacing Dionysus.
The unification of these elements in the creation of great art is particularly
interesting, as both forces are oppositional in nature. For Nietzsche, the interaction and
unification of the Apolline and the Dionysiac is what comprises excellent art, and the
implications of these elements in art are significant to suffering because o f the way they
demonstrate the creation of art through oppositional force:
Dionysus and Apollo represent something more than a mechanism for affirming
the instinctive background of art. They also propose a connection between art and
suffering....The Apolline artist creates by sublimating the suffering o f the world,
his Dionysiac counterpart by self-negating participation in it.9
Art is the mechanism by which we deal with our suffering. Apollo gives man those things
which comfort him, he is lulled into security through these delusions, or warped images
of what the world is. Nietzsche clearly does not see these Apolline visions as something
concrete and real, but rather an illusion. Conversely, Dionysus gives those who are strong
enough to engage with the world the tools to do so.
Consider the context in which this Nietzschean ideal is operating. Once we have
denied the existence of God, we have fewer ways to understand our suffering. Nietzsche
offers these creative elements as a remedy to nihilism in the following way; we
understand our position in the universe as without a broad divine purpose. In light of this
rather dark and cold reality, man must reinterpret his understanding of the world. There is
no afterworld contingent upon behavior in our physical reality, there are no ultimate
goods, there is no purposive reason - quite literally, all of those things encompassed by
8 Berkowitz, Peter, Nietzsche: Ethics of an Immoralist (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1996), 55.
9 Silk and Stem, Nietzsche on Tragedy, 233.
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what there is, are all we have. Consider the following example of Nietzsche’s addition of
Silenus’ view in Eudemos:
Wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force
me to tell you the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to
hear? The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been bom, not
to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon.10
Concerning this passage, we can ask ourselves how one affirms life in this universe. For
Nietzsche the ultimate expression of this is in primordial unity itself - the distinctively
Dionysiac expression of man’s authenticity through an embrace of his instinctive
passions and drives. Dionysus is, in this way, life affirming: we are not preparing
ourselves to die as Socrates understands it; instead, we are preparing ourselves to live.
Nietzsche offers us no visions of heaven, outside of that which we have on Earth, so his
emphasis in this regard to life-affirmation flows logically.
Apollo and Dionysus give us the tools necessary to endure, but they do so
unequally in Nietzsche’s view. The potentiality for the weak to hide within the illusionary
constructs of order presents a threat to the Dionysiac method of creation; yet, there is a
reconciliation between these two forces that recognizes itself in the affirmation of life. As
Berkowitz writes, the appropriation of Dionysiac elements over the Apolline occurs at
multiple points throughout Birth o f Tragedy', however, their instances of unequal
treatment do not negate the relationship that Nietzsche sets out in the beginning of his
work. Berkowitz offers the following insight, “Since redemption must occur not above or
after but within life, and since Dionysus is the this-worldly deity par excellence, the
Apollonian dreamer must join forces with the Dionysian reveler to satisfy the Greeks’

10 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 23.
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powerful need to love life.”11 It is within this need to love life that we see a
demonstration of Nietzsche’s emphasis on tragic culture as a paradigm for how one
combats the potential nihilism that spreads from his worldview.
The importance of art in a world that has denied truth is of ultimate significance
to this discussion. Greek tragedy is unique for Nietzsche in its ability to equip man with
the ability to face his seemingly meaningless reality without turning himself over entirely
to nihilism, or the asceticism of the sick priest. “Once truth has been seen, the
consciousness of it prompts man to see only what is terrible or absurd in existence
wherever he looks; now he understands the symbol of Ophelia’s fate, now he grasps the
wisdom of the wood-god Silenus: he feels revulsion.”12 Upon full realization o f the
abyss, Nietzsche argues that, through art, we are submerged in a rescue mission o f sorts.
Knowledge, without the additional support of great art, leaves man without resources to
cope with his reality: “here, at this moment of supreme danger for the will, art
approaches as a saving sorceress with the power to heal. Art alone can re-direct those
repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature of existence into representations
with which man can live.”

1

^

The particular treatment of representations “with which man can live” is carefully
worded on Nietzsche’s part, for “works of art, like philosophical writings, are ciphers to
be decoded. They represent an amalgam of life-affirming and life-denying drives.”14
Healthy spiritedness is directly related to the understanding of great art. Given the aim of
11 Berkowitz, Ethics o f an Immoralist, 52.
12 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 40.
13 Ibid., 41.
14 Thiele, Leslie Paul, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul: A Study o f Heroic
Individualism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 130.
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art as supplemental to the right accordance of spiritedness, good art can be described as
the work of a healthy artist. Leslie Paul Thiele notes this distinction, envisioning
Nietzsche’s interpretation of the value of art as related to the spiritedness o f the artist. In
giving us representations “with which man can live,” Nietzsche is suggesting a
connection to life-affirmation that is present in great art. “Art not only veils truth so we
may endure life, it stimulates us to live more fully.”15
Nietzsche’s deliberate treatment of Silenus provides his audience with an
alternative: while we may not be able to change the inevitable fate of our meaningless
existence, through the forces that drive Greek tragedy, we can produce great things.
Utilizing the analogy that was provided at the beginning of this subsection, we can
understand and interpret Nietzsche’s use of Greek tragedy as vehicle for human
excellence. The sufferings required to produce great art are thus necessary to produce
great men - and through the trials and tribulations of the Greek tragedy, man can achieve
such transcendence from the common, to the overman.

The Spirit o f Transcendence: Suffering, Struggle and Heroism in Greek Tragedy
The hero of Greek tragedy provides insight into the Nietzschean ideal. Faced with
the harsh reality so aptly identified by Silenus, the hero is the individual who embodies
the spiritedness of Dionysus and engages with reality on its own unforgiving terms,
enduring the severity of such reality with health and vigor. This conceptual understanding
of happiness through pain signifies an important aspect of Greek tragedy as it relates to
human excellence. He who suffers jubilantly is among the excellent. Suffering unlocks
this potential amongst the great, who possess the strength of spirit necessary to endure
15 Ibid., 138.
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suffering. Thus, the audience comes to recognize the Dionysiac in the tragic hero, and
identify his sufferings and glory as a paradigm for human excellence.
The role of the hero in Greek tragedy is to demonstrate suffering; and, in keeping
with Nietzsche’s view of tragedy, both the Apolline and Dionysiac are present in the
episodes of the heroic struggle.16 Within the context of great art, the tragic hero
demonstrates a transcendence of his condition in the form of resolve, in the same way
that art transcends structured conceptualizations of reality:
In the first instance, the content of the tragic myth is an epic event with its
glorification of the fighting hero; yet from what source does that inherently
mysterious feature of tragedy come...its preference for presenting even anew in
countless forms the suffering in the hero’s fate, the most painful, repeated
overcoming of obstacles, the most agonizing conflict of motives...for the fact that
tragic things do happen in life would no way explain the origins of a form of art,
unless art did not simply imitate the reality of nature but rather supplied a
metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature, and was set alongside the latter
as a means of overcoming it.17
Taking Nietzsche’s suggestion, it is through tragedy that man is faced with his reality.
Man comes to the full realization of Silenus’ claim, and he must therefore act in
accordance with this knowledge. The glorious hero comes to understand his position as
license to act; his suffering has forced him to seek meaning - and it is in this struggle that
he comes to realize his position within the cosmos as the Dionysiac actor. Struggle is
inherent to life, and through the struggle we are able to discern the great men from the
weak. Perseverance in the face of suffering, for Nietzsche, is not simply tolerating
suffering, but feelingyoy from the sensation that something is being overcome.

16 It is my argument that Dionysiac elements overshadow Apolline in the grand scheme o f
Nietzsche’s understanding o f the excellent. Yet, this does not mean that Apollo entirely disappears. Instead
I tend to agree with Berkowitz on this point: that Apollo turns to bolster the Dionysiac.
17 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 113.
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Richard Schacht iterates this point - highlighting the importance of suffering for
Nietzsche’s world view. As Schacht demonstrates, the strength that is so central to the
concept of the noble is invigorated by strife, “the joy he repeatedly celebrates is not one
characterized by obliviousness to suffering, but rather by a strength and vitality great
enough to enable one to take it in stride.”18 Schacht goes on to add commentary
concerning the pervasiveness of this relationship with suffering as it exists throughout his
work, from Birth o f Tragedy to the end of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Revisiting his Birth o f Tragedy in Ecce Homo, it is clear that Nietzsche himself
asserted predominance of Dionysus over Apollo in terms of excellent creative forces and it is also clear throughout his short, but direct, treatment of the matter that Nietzsche
sees something in Dionysus that is crucial to the understanding of the relationship
between tragedy, suffering, and excellence specifically. Through the hero’s struggle the
audience is brought to the realization that life itself is the ultimate end. The hero’s resolve
in the face of suffering is an affirmation of life, possible only through those with a
particular disposition toward life. Consider Kathleen Mary Higgins’ commentary on the
tragic hero in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. The tragic hero embodied for the audience the
exemplar of human excellence in the face of crushing loss. The tragic hero thus affirms
life, even in the face of pain and suffering:
That Oedipus continues at all when he has lost everything is a striking reminder
that, despite the appearance that contingent things grant value to our lives, we
ultimately value life itself as good unconditionally.... Tragic loss reveals our
basic disposition toward life when all its contingent charms have fled. What we
may discover, when our Apollonian sense of security has failed us, is that we love

18 Schacht, Richard, Nietzsche (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 458.
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life anyway and that the worst of fate is powerless to make us regret being part of
it.19
The hero demonstrates an attitude toward life that Nietzsche finds central to excellence.
Concerning the future, Nietzsche ties the successful overthrow of herd morality to
the return of a Dionysian mode of existence. All creation necessarily requires a sort of
destruction, and in the creation of new value, Nietzsche sees the importance of the
Dionysiac as the only road back to authenticity. Only the Dionysiac is equipped with the
tools necessary to destroy and rebuild, to act upon the physical world in a way that brings
forth new meaning and renders new knowledge. As Nietzsche writes:
Let us look ahead a century; let us suppose that my attempt to assassinate two
millennia of antinature and desecration of man were to succeed. The new party of
life which would tackle the greatest of all tasks, the attempt to raise humanity
higher, including the relentless destruction of everything that was degenerating
and parasitical, would again make possible the excess of life on earth from which
the Dionysian state, too, would have to awaken again. I promise a tragic age: the
highest art in saying yes to life, tragedy, will be reborn when humanity has
weathered the consciousness of the hardest but most necessary wars without
suffering from it.20
While it is most likely safe to assume that Nietzsche would find iterations o f the Apolline
in tragic culture post-revaluation as acceptable, insofar as they were life-affirming, there
is nothing Apolline about the revaluation itself. Quite the contrary, as evidenced by this
passage, the destruction that comes along with the revaluation necessitates the Dionysiac.
Returning to the discussion of the hero, it is clear that, for Nietzsche, the hero who
endures suffering jubilantly is undoubtedly Dionysiac in nature. In this way we can typify
all higher men as such, including Nietzsche’s own Zarathustra - as I argue, Nietzsche

19 Higgins, Kathleen Mary, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1987), 37.
20 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Ecce Homo in On The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. Walter
Kaufmann and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York : Vintage Books, 1989), 274.
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sees all of them as heroes of their own tragic age. In this vein, the character of the
Nietzschean hero ought to give us pause. In Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche clearly outlines
that what the Dionysiac ultimately is: those expressions which stand contrary to moral
thought. As he writes:
Morality itself - might it not be a “will to negate life,” a secret instinct for
annihilation, a principle of decay, belittlement, calumny, the beginning of the
end? And consequently the greatest danger of all? Thus my instinct turned against
morality at the time I wrote this questionable book; as an advocate of life my
instinct invented for itself a fundamentally opposed doctrine and counter
evaluation of life, a purely artistic one, an anti-Christian one. What was it to be
called? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without a certain
liberty - for who can know the true name of the Antichrist? - by the name of a
Greek god: I called it Dionysiac.
To the extent that the hero of Greek tragedy encompasses and embodies the Dionysiac
spirit, he logically stands in opposition to Christian morals. The hero of the tragic age is,
using Nietzsche’s own terminology, the anti-Christ.
The hero embodies those things we typically associate with manliness.

Strength

is what we should attribute to the hero of Greek tragedy, as he embodies all of those
things which Nietzsche argues were the original epicenter of “good.” This is meant in a
very specific context, namely referencing those things Nietzsche associates with the
noble sentiments - resoluteness and free spiritedness resulting in a complete break from
guilt, envy, ressentiment and fictions of the herd morality. Before the slave revolt and the
predominance of slave morality, it was this tragic hero that possessed Nietzschean
21 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 9.
22 Harvey Mansfield points out Nietzsche’s rebirth o f tragedy as the answer to nihilism in an effort
to re-embrace manliness in Manliness. As he writes, “If we recall the passage in Plato’s Republic where
Socrates seems scandalized by the bad example set by the behavior o f the gods displayed in Homer’s Iliad,
we can see that Nietzsche wants to revive for our time the warring Gods that Socrates declared
impermissible. Let em ’ rip! Warring gods will reintroduce drama and value to us, give us a problem,
confront us with a task - the monumental task o f rescuing mankind from the last men.” See Manliness
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 113.
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spiritedness. The hero is the noble spirit, the blond beast, the higher man. Tragedy sets
forth the appropriate cultural context in which we can cultivate the overman that is of
central focus in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In tragic culture we realize the higher men —and
I would argue that the hero of Greek tragedy specifically is important for understanding
the kind of individual that this higher man is: a man who stands jubilantly in the face of
destruction.23
The hero is an exemplar of the higher man, presented to the audience as the
excellent and ideal. It is the hero who suffers his fate with resolve and strength. His
spiritedness is to be admired. In this way, Greek tragedy does not set out to reinforce the
herd, but rather to reinforce hierarchy. The strong and the excellent is preferred over the
weak and common, and the hero is an illustration of this strength and excellence. The
higher man is the hero, and in his presentation to the audience we see the deconstruction
of egalitarianism, we see hierarchy and embattled spirits, overcoming their humanity
through a spirited affirmation of their own life. Only the great can access this faculty
rightly:
It is through the “You higher men” - thus blinks the mob - “there are no higher
men, we are all equal, man is man; before God we are all equal!” Before God! But
now this god has died. And before the mob we do not want to be equal...you
higher men, this god was your greatest danger. It is only since he lies in his tomb
that you have been resurrected. Only now the great noon comes; only now the
higher man becomes -lord.”24
23 Carol Diethe’s definition in the Historical Dictionary o f Nietzscheanism is helpful here to
demonstrate the qualities o f the higher men: “Nietzsche’s term for the embryonic human who, with his
courage, cheerfulness, propensity for laughter and essential nobility o f spirit, has the potential to develop
into the Übermensch, a development contingent on his acceptance o f the will to power and eternal return
and his readiness to adopt the fundamentals o f master morality. He must seek to construct his own morality
and to create his own destiny by a willing affirmation o f life and by amor fati.” See, Historical Dictionary
o f Nietzscheanism (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1999), 119-120.
24 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Modem Library, 1995), 286.
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The higher men are among the only men that can destroy the rationalism that has
perpetuated decadence. Through the actions of the hero, we can come to understand the
blond beast that sits behind his noble spiritedness: the Dionysiac.

It is this genealogy

that ought to give readers pause when considering precisely what it would take to revalue
all value in the manner Nietzsche would find worthy.
What about the story I have constructed thus far compels us to think that the
higher man bom of this process will demonstrate a measure of respect toward those who
they consider to be inferior, or unequal, to them? Can we so readily assume that he who
jubilantly says “yes” to himself in the face of suffering will take care to uphold certain
standards of human decency? To what standard would man appeal concerning such
matters in any event? While these questions are widely rhetorical, their significance
should not go unnoticed. Within the purview of the hero alone, we should not assume that
these men would deign to express such weakness through respect for all men. It’s
plausible to conceive of individuals who would will to love in this way; yet, in a world
where there are competing wills, how do we evaluate the moments in which he who wills
to love comes across the individual who wills the torture o f another?
What makes Greek tragedy appealing as a basis for inquiry in Birth o f Tragedy is
Nietzsche’s emphasis on a pre-moral world. The cultural context of ancient Greece
provided such a construct for Nietzsche, making the art of this period particularly
noteworthy for study. The Apolline and Dionysiac, though oppositional in nature, were
able to coexist in the pre-moral universe, and nothing about Nietzsche’s thought
explicitly states that this coexistence cannot occur again in a time after morality has been

25 Nietzsche identifies the epic hero as the “servant o f Dionysus” on page 46 o f Birth o f Tragedy.
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undone. In the case of our current society, I would argue that Nietzsche would say that in
order to bring back the tragic culture - a hero of Dionysiac proportions and immorality
would be needed.

Negation o f Suffering: Socrates and the end o f Tragedy
As Nietzsche writes in Birth o f Tragedy, “there is nothing more terrible than a
class of barbaric slaves which has learned to regard its existence as an injustice and
which sets out to take revenge, not just for itself but for all future generations.”

It is this

very endeavor which Nietzsche appropriates to Socratic thought. Socratic culture chains
itself to knowledge.27 In its attempts to chain creative forces by imposing reason to the
universe, rational order provides a context by which the heroic withers away. In the
Platonic view, reason is the ruler of the universe; consequently, fine and excellent art
become products of a harmony with this reason. The universe of the Platonic is not
haunted by the cloud of nihilism, so essentially we have negated the necessity for life
affirmation of the Nietzschean variety. As the argument goes, the Platonic life in light of
the Good is the Platonic version of “life-affirmation.” Throughout the Socratic dialogues
we are given an alternative answer to the challenge posed by Silenus - we negate his
assertion that “the best thing is to die soon” in favor of the best thing is to live in harmony
with the Good.

26 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 87.
27 For more on this topic see: Megill, Allan, Prophets o f Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Foucault, Derrida (Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1985). Consider the categories o f culture
that Allan Megill discusses in Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida: “In
‘Socratic’ culture, men are chained by the delusion (Wahn) that through the love o f knowledge they will be
able to ‘heal the eternal wound o f existence.’ In ‘artistic’ culture, they are ensnared by the ‘seductive veil o f
beauty’ fluttering before their eyes. In ‘tragic culture’, they are given ‘metaphysical comfort’ by the belief
that ‘beneath the whirl o f phenomena eternal life flows on indestructibly.’” p. 41.
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As one could imagine, this offends Nietzschean sensibilities on a multitude o f
levels - but namely, it negates and chokes off all of those qualities that bolster the hero.
Platonism smothers the tragic hero in his cradle, leaving him chained to the herd morality
in all of its toxic forms. The Platonist rejects the necessity of suffering in the name of
egalitarianism, the equality of the soul is highlighted as an important fact about human
life. We no longer view ourselves as hierarchical and free willed, we are all subject to the
same will of the Good through invented prisons of guilt and pity. In their envy, the weak
lock the spirit of the strong in these iron cages, leaving them with nothing but a kind o f
impotent desire.
No Nietzschean piece is complete without some reference to criticism o f Plato —
and the case of Birth o f Tragedy is no exception to this. Rather fittingly, Nietzsche
blames the death of tragedy on Socrates and his adherents, chaining great art to the lowly
enterprise of pandering to the common. In this way, the hero does not take center stage as
the paradigm of excellence for his savagery and jubilance in the face of opposition;
instead, the humble, the lowly, and the rational are seen as the actors to be admired. In his
endeavor to provide a clearer link between knowledge, causation and the universe, the
character of Socrates embodies everything Nietzsche is against. The whole of Platonic
thought provides man with a picture of the universe that stands in opposition to the
artistic drives of Apollo and Dionysus, and this picture is distinctly moral.
In his attempt to define the Good, Socrates rationalizes our world. While we can
characterize this sort of activity as Apolline in nature, the concept of the Good implies
something that Apollo does not: a moral standard. One does not look to the Greek gods
for expressions of a moral standard, and it is this fact that Nietzsche is acutely aware of.
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Platonic thought constructs an entire universe that is intangible to man, the universe of
reason. In the simplest of terms, we do not feel the immediacy of the Good in the way
that we feel the effects of the Dionysiac. Whereas the Socratic vision realizes excellence
in those things that accord with a specific kind of order, or harmony; the Dionysiac
realizes excellence in primordial unity, or the disordered chaos of the physical world.
Given the position of Dionysus as the god of the sufferer, so to speak, we can now
evaluate the idea of Socrates as symbolic of a view that is contra-suffering, and in turn,
contra-Dionysus. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze touches upon the
opposition between this point in regard to Socrates and Dionysus:
The true opposition is not the wholly dialectical one between Dionysus and
Apollo but the deeper one between Dionysus and Socrates. It is not Apollo who is
opposed to the tragic or through whom the tragic dies, it is Socrates: and Socrates
is as little Apollonian as Dionysian.28
As Nietzsche demonstrates in Birth o f Tragedy, the death of tragic culture came with the
Platonic urge to rationalize a purpose of existence - opposing the idea that man needed
the Apolline semblance and Dionysiac exertion to live.
Consider how Nietzsche views the legacy of Socratic thought in the JudeoChristian story. Rational order is bom of the idea that we are subservient beings to an allpowerful God. There is a will that acts in the universe preeminent to our own, and we
surrender our will to this being in faith. We come to understand our misfortunes, and the
pain resulting from these misfortunes, as part of some divine purpose. Consequently, we
see suffering as something imparted upon us by a higher being. We realize a purposive
nature in suffering within this view. Man is given an answer to Silenus’ assertions in light
of this divine purpose - but it certainly is not the answer that Nietzsche is looking for. In
28
Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), 13.
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contrast, man endures his suffering within this context passively. There is no Dionysiac
release of passion will, because it is not man’s will that is the ultimate purpose of the
cosmos —it is God’s.29
The Socratic levels and blunts the artistic measure of tragedy by attempting to
provide a mirror for the common in art. Rather than displaying the hero, Socratic
dialectic places everyday life as the central figure to be examined. In his attempt to define
the Good, the Socratic dialectic destroys the foundation Nietzsche sets for great art - the
tragic hero is effectually brought to the people. For Nietzsche, this great leveling began
through the works of Euripides’ New Comedy - who, Nietzsche argues, was a puppet of
sorts, catering to Socrates’ view. As Nietzsche writes, “In a certain sense Euripides, too,
was merely a mask; the deity who spoke out of him was not Dionysos, nor Apollo, but an
altogether newborn daemon called Socrates.”

We see the effects of Platonism in art as a

form of pandering to the common, in a vulgar egalitarian spirit:
Anyone who has recognized from what stuff the Promethean tragedians before
Euripides shaped their heroes, and how far they were from wanting to put on
stage the faithful mask of reality, will also be aware that Euripides’ aim was
entirely different. Thanks to him people from everyday life pushed their way out
of the audience and on to the stage; the mirror which once revealed only great and
bold features now became painfully true to life, reproducing conscientiously even
the lines which nature had drawn badly. In the hands of the new poets Odysseys,
the typical Hellene of older art, now sank to the level of the Graeculus figure who,
as a good-natured and cunning domestic slave, is at the centre of dramatic interest
from now on.31
In allowing the audience to enter the stage, we have perforated the wall that once kept the
pathos of distance alive and well.

29 For the sake o f simplicity I’ve collapsed the discussion o f the Platonic with that o f the JudeoChristian, as the main point to be noted here is the difference in will.
30 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 60.
31 Ibid., 55.
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Nietzsche’s propensity for art demonstrates the clear distinction between the
Platonic and the Nietzschean. For Nietzsche, it is art that demonstrates forms of reality.
The stage is where we convey reality, and the hero ought to be the center of this stage.
Thus we have tragic man. However, if the stage abandons the hero and instead takes on
the qualities of the herd, we begin to see a cultural crisis, in the form of the introduction
of the theoretical man:
The Platonic philosopher-soldier, whose education is primarily mathematical and
who remains the guardian angel of the ostensibly “liberal” Enlightenment (liberal
because dedicated to freedom), leads to the tyranny of form, presence, structure,
rules, and universality in the sense of the suppression of disagreement, which
itself is stigmatized as “ignorance.” In place of the philosopher-soldier, the
postmodernist put Nietzsche’s artist-warrior: poetry replaces mathematics,
difference replaces identity, and creation is unmasked as destruction.32
In this way, the Socratic leads to a different attitude toward suffering altogether.
Nietzsche identifies scientific thought as a branch of Platonism that has brought ruin to
great culture through the remedy of suffering and the perpetuation o f comfort. As
Nietzsche writes, “what I understand by the spirit of science is the belief, which first
came to light in the person of Socrates, that the depths of nature can be fathomed and that
knowledge can heal all ills.”
For Nietzsche, the theoretical man that stands in opposition to the tragic
essentially views his world as entirely in accordance with reason. In his rationalization of
man’s existence, Socrates and his adherents find comfort in something entirely different
from myth - scientific rationalization. It is through this mechanistic action of Truth in the
cosmos that man begins to perceive the world around him as comprehensible without the

32 Rosen, Stanley, Hermeneutics as Politics, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 8.
33 Nietzsche, Birth o f Tragedy, 82.
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additional supplement of myth. Man begins to conceive of himself as capable “not simply
of understanding existence, but even of correcting /Y.”34
Within the view of theoretical man, suffering begins to take on new meaning.
Consider the final scene of Apology, where Socrates declares, “fix your minds on this one
belief, which is certain: that nothing can harm a good man either in life or after death.”35
If you take this position seriously, and believe, as argue Socrates did, that the good life is
the ultimate end of human existence - we come to associate things like suffering with a
theory of justice. Justice is a reflection of the good, and things that were once considered
weak in the Nietzschean universe become virtues. We see things like pity, forgiveness,
mercy, and guilt spring from a desire to mediate suffering. Through our view o f equality
we seek to comfort man. In Christianity, which Nietzsche would argue is repackaged
Platonism, this is particularly apparent. One need only place “dona nobis pacem” against
“rise now, ride, thou great noon” to see the great contrast between the passive weakness
of Platonic will to decline against the active might of Dionysus.

Conclusion
In light of the impending nihilism to befall man in the wake o f God’s death,
Nietzsche argues for a return to tragic culture. The knowledge of God’s absence presents
a reality that is too difficult for the weak to endure. In their despair, the weak cling to the
apparatus of rational order, despite secularization. Society has been so thoroughly
inculcated with the herd weakness that man still clings to his doctrines o f equality and

34 Ibid., 73.
35 Plato, Apology in The Last Days o f Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, trans. Hugh
Tredennick and Harrold Tarrant (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 70.
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peace, in the pursuit of his own comfort. Thus, for Nietzsche, modernity still carries the
rotten smell of the divine, and it will take the appropriation of a tragic culture to fix this
decadent state of affairs.
In this way, Birth o f Tragedy is an important text for study - as Nietzsche presents
the foundations for his argument concerning the problems with modernity, and his
remedy. The only way to combat the decadence brought about by the Platonic will to
decline is to re-embrace the tragic hero. The structure of Greek tragedy provides a
microcosm of the society Nietzsche advocates for. We must reinstate the excellence of
the overman on the world stage by placing the herd back in the audience, where they
belong. The mechanism by which we do this is human suffering - through a removal of
the constructs that lead to the furthering of man’s comfort, i.e. doctrines of equality,
foundations of liberal order and the like.
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Chapter 3
Nietzsche and Modernity: The Last Man in Progressive Thought
How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was
holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under
our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean
ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to
invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not
become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed;
and whoever is bom after us - for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher
history than all history hitherto.
— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

Revisiting the “Parable of the Madman,” in light of the death o f God, have we
lived up to the tall order of Nietzsche’s higher historyl I argue we have not. Given
everything Nietzsche wrote concerning higher men and the revaluation, it is apparent that
modem society currently possesses all the attributes Nietzsche feared it would: we live in
the age of the last men. Thus, the moral project of modem world is a failure in
Nietzsche’s eyes. Instead of embracing suffering as something necessary to man’s
excellence, man has continued to perpetuate the herd morality, clinging to those things
that give him comfort from the harsh reality of existence.
The West has appropriated a version of “Kant’s joke,” agreeing to the death of
God, but maintaining the order that was founded by philosophers and priests: the morality
that chains the strong. As a society, we have turned away from the good, the true and the
beautiful; yet, the saturation of herd morality in society has remained, perpetuating its
continued success.1 A true revaluation of morals requires nothing less than distinctly
immoral action. Under the direction of Dionysiac release, philosophizing with a hammer

1
In Book VI o f The Republic, Socrates discusses the forms o f beauty and good. Plato, The
Republic trans. Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996),
196.
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quite literally means just that, destroying the societal constructs that have been thrust
upon us by the slaves. To do this, we need to re-embrace suffering through the tragic
culture and the tragic man, reinstating the hierarchy that is so central to Nietzschean
thought. It is only then when man will realize the full influence of his actions, and come
to understand what it truly means to live in the wake of the death o f God.
The places in which we see iterations of the last men are all around us in modem
society. Modem liberalism fits Nietzsche’s description of the society o f the last men
rather accurately. In a world where man has denied morality, but idiosyncratically still
demands his dignity and freedom, we see the pervasive hold of decadence. Nietzsche’s
secular case for suffering stands against the prevailing attitude of our time, begging the
question, why shouldn’t man suffer? The answer we find in liberalism is rather
unsatisfactory in this regard, as modem liberalism really has no good answer for
Nietzsche - nor do modem thinkers begin from a premise by which we can justifiably
reject Nietzsche’s argument for suffering. In its rejection and amelioration o f suffering,
modem liberalism has not undertaken the revaluation; instead the West has appropriated
a bastardized version of the old priest-philosopher creed - in the form o f systematized
and legally codified herd morality. In this way, Nietzsche is entirely correct in his
assertion: “in late ages that may be proud of their humanity, so much fear remains, so
much superstitious fear of the “savage cruel beast” whose conquest is the very pride of
these more humane ages.”
In this chapter I will examine contemporary liberal thinkers as they respond to the
issue of suffering: namely through the total rejection of suffering in favor o f comfort. In

2
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f the Future, trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989) 158.
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its rejection of suffering, liberalism has appropriated interest and emotion as justification
for the ideals that they hold so central to their view - but in what ways are their theories
unjustifiable when opposed by the Nietzschean society? Because of its focus on comfort,
as opposed to suffering, liberalism is ultimately the expression of decadence that
Nietzsche himself so detested. Simultaneously, we find similarities between the modem
liberal and Nietzsche - namely, in the structure of their moral theories. With its
foundation firmly planted in the rejection of universal truth, in favor of an inconsistent
but relativism, one questions how liberalism would find a basis to reject Nietzsche’s case
for suffering, which ultimately is a result of a similar rejection of moral universals. In the
second half of this chapter, I will outline the rhetoric of violence Nietzsche uses to
describe the revaluation, highlighting the ways in which Nietzsche’s revaluation ends in a
society where people choose not to be nice to one another.
Throughout his works, Nietzsche was primarily concerned with decadence as a
response to Silenus’ claim concerning life: “The very best thing is utterly beyond your
■j

reach not to have been bom, not to be, to be nothing.” He realized all too poignantly the
problem nihilism posed to mankind; yet, his support for the Greek option should tell
readers precisely what he thinks about comfort. Irrationality and suffering open a window
in the hearts of men, allowing them to see Nietzsche’s option as one that brings them
meaning once more. The tragic hero does not fear suffering, nor does he despair of it - he
faces it with jovial resolve. He understands himself to be the creator in this regard, and
has no use for the comfort offered by decadence. In this way, all those things associated
with the herd are of no ultimate use to him: pity, guilt, disgust and shame are the
3
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth o f Tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed.
Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs and trans. Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 23.
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workings of the weak. The truly strong hero who has accepted the death of God does not
turn to comfort, he embraces his position as the tragic hero, the higher man, the overman.
However, Nietzsche recognizes the fact that modernity has not embraced his
worldview. Instead, Nietzsche identifies a continued support for the weak and their
apparatuses of comfort. Decaying Platonism leads to decadence, to the extent that man
does not adequately destroy the herd morality. A multitude of things are typically
associated with “decadence” - yet, they all revolve around life negating principles.
Platonism and Christianity are often described as decadent, due to what Nietzsche calls
their “will to decline.” As Richard Schacht puts it:
[Nietzsche] diagnoses the phenomenon of ‘decadence’ ultimately as a
consequence of certain physiological deficiencies and psychological defects. He
attributes some of the inadequacies of philosophers to the fact that they are too
much children of their age, too naive and superficial, and ignorant of too many
things; but he discerns this constitutional affliction at the root of the most fateful
of their shortcomings. He speaks of their having been dominated by ‘ulterior
moral motives’ in this connection, because the sort of morality he has in mind is
one of the basic manifestations of ‘decadence’ (which he glosses in terms of
exhaustion, weakness, hypersensitivity and diminished vitality) through which a
disposition of hostility toward life and the conditions of existence is both given
semblance of dignity and provided with apparent justification.4
Liberalism can be evaluated upon these grounds. Consider the approach taken by John
Rawls with the veil of ignorance, and how Nietzsche might criticize this approach. While
it is not the primary aim of this paper to discuss John Rawls at any length, a good way to
conceptualize this kind of thinking - a contemporary version of Kant - is in the thought
of Rawls. Constructivist morals are a prime example of this type of systemization
Nietzsche would so disdain. For Nietzsche, whether the herd chooses to will its
egalitarian mediocrity is irrelevant, it is still a weak choice.

4 Schacht, Richard, Nietzsche (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 27.
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We create this system on a basis of pragmatism, or those things which give us the
greatest utility and pleasure, coupled with the residual sentimentality o f the herd encompassed by things like human equality and human dignity. Modem liberalism’s
reliance on positivism as a replacement for moral universals conceptually appropriates a
Nietzschean endeavor, denying moral precepts, while maintaining the comfort and
complacency of the herd. In this way, modem society is not reflective of the revaluation
that Nietzsche so desires, as we have not pruned our social orders of the slave morality.
Consider Martha Nussbaum’s use of emotions in Hiding from Humanity as a basis
by which we can promote liberal society. At the outset, Nussbaum distinguishes herself
from the liberal utilitarian on the one hand, and the reimagined Kantianism of Rawls on
the other, arguing her position provides a level of depth and complexity that utilitarianism
overlooks - how laws ultimately end up making us feel. In her critique of M ill’s “greatest
happiness for the greatest number,” she asserts that happiness in the utilitarian view
focuses too much on material comfort, and not enough on the ways in which laws
subjugate different peoples’ feelings.5 In this way, we can highlight an important piece of
Nussbaum’s philosophy that accords with Nietzsche’s critique of modernity. In her
works, it is Nussbaum’s aim to abolish suffering, not only through material comfort but
through the abolition of those things which potentially make us feel bad.
Dignity and equality are the cornerstones by which she founds her argument, and
Nussbaum’s primary point is to elucidate the ways in which shame and disgust threaten
respect for these liberal values. In Hiding From Humanity, Nussbaum writes:
Thinking about the ideals inherent in the political conception helps us identify
clearly some dangers we face if we give disgust and shame a prominent role in the
5
Nussbaum, Martha, C., Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 323.
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foundations of law. For both emotions, when used as the basis for legal
regulation, seem, in different ways, to threaten mutual respect...indeed we can see
that the dangers posed by disgust and shame are in many respects especially
antithetical to the values of a liberal society.6
Her picture of man is one that emphasizes man’s desire to feel good, and protected from
the scorn of disgust and inner feelings of shame. Nussbaum looks to liberal society to
mediate these feelings through an understanding of mutual human dignity.
Yet, because of her rejection of the universal, mutual respect for human dignity is
seemingly arbitrary. Nussbaum asserts that this dignity is something that we all want, by
virtue of our feelings, as if the feelings alone could provide a defense against those whose
feelings accord with causing suffering. If we assume that no one group or individual
wants to feel lesser than his peer, we can make a case for human equality on the grounds
that anything less would make us feel bad: “Subordination causes pain to vulnerable
individuals in all societies; in liberal society it also threatens core political values.” We
can think of Nussbaum’s general approach as a soft Hobbesian sentimentalism - not only
do we want a regime to protect us from physical pain, we want to be free o f emotional
pain as well. In this way, respect for human dignity comes to take on a meaning apart
from what the adherent of natural law would argue. Outcome is just as important as the
rule in this sense. Consider the following - as a woman, my dignity is being disrespected
if I disallowed to partake in a particular activity by virtue of my sex. By disqualifying me
from certain professions and the like, the argument goes, you are making me feel bad irrespective of the legitimacy, or reasons, for my exclusion.

6 Ibid., 321.
7 Ibid., 323.
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In this view, human beings are sophisticated animals. Whether or not she wants to
admit the association, Nussbaum has placed herself on the same level as Nietzsche when
it comes to a picture of man. She has denied the idea that moral concepts exist outside of
what has been agreed upon, and in doing so she has denied that there is any categorical
basis for respecting human persons. As she writes, “the analysis o f disgust and
shame...shows us that human beings typically have a problematic relationship to their
morality and animality, and that this problematic relationship causes not only inner
tension, but also aggression toward others.”8 Nussbaum takes this rhetorical sleight of
hand with a grain of salt, but it is important to recognize the deference she is giving to the
passions in this way. Whereas Plato would argue this tension between reason and passion
is a battle that should end in the victory of reason, Nussbaum comes to a starkly different
conclusion: what ultimately makes me feel better? If indulgence truly is what makes the
individual feel better, Nussbaum has no good justification to impose any limitation on
where indulgence of one’s own passion ends. In other words, once we have reduced
things to a matter of feelings, how do I impose standards concerning which pursuits are in
fact worthy? If it makes one person feel good to practice the art of making lampshades
out of human skin, how do I assess the value of their passion over another? Why abolish
suffering if suffering causes some people great pleasure?
For Nussbaum, the central foundation for judgments concerning right human
behavior can be found in an examination of the emotions, as expressions of a being that is
“vulnerable”:
What I am calling for... [is] a society that acknowledges its own humanity, and
neither hides from it nor it from us; a society of citizens who admit that they are
needy and vulnerable, and who disregard the grandiose demands for omnipotence
8 Ibid., 322.
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and completeness that has been at the heart of so much human misery, both public
and private. To an extent, its spirit is less Millian than Whitmanesque: it
constructs a public myth of equal humanity, to substitute for other pernicious
myths that have long guided us...This, it seems to me, is a good way to proceed in
a liberal society, by which I mean one based on a recognition of the equal dignity
of each individual, and the vulnerabilities inherent in a common humanity.9
Nussbaum rejects the universal as “grandiose demands for omnipotence and
completeness,” yet applies her own standard, “a recognition of the equal dignity o f each
individual.” At the end of the day, enforcing protection of human equality comes down to
a matter of force - we have no rationally defensible picture of humankind, so we must
reduce matters of human dignity to the level of legality.
Utilitarianism behaves in a similar way, yet determines utility, as opposed to
emotion, as the central foundation to be considered. Within this view interest is most
important. If we deny that there is a moral precept that holds us back from pleasure, like
the adherent to emotion, the utilitarian looks to those things which bring us pleasure as
good. While there are gradations of utilitarianism, we ultimately rely on pragmatism as
the dictate of taste and utility. Like Nussbaum’s vision, the dogma of utilitarianism
ultimately rests in a rejection of suffering. While potentially less sophisticated than
Nussbaum’s system, these theories rest on similar premises - man should not suffer.
Yet, despite their rejection of the universal, these varying ethical lenses have very
definite implications for the understanding of law. Ironically, the negation o f moral
universal seems to send modem liberals right to the business of universal-making once
more, this time repackaging moral concepts in a way that makes them utterly indefensible
on a rational level - yet are somehow more palatable to modem man because they no
longer smell of the church. Turning to the law as our source for this type o f moral, or in

9

Ibid., 17-18.
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this context amoral, imperative is problematic as well. If we conceive of law as divorced
from moral imperatives, and rather just an expression of aggregate public opinion, we are
ultimately advocating for a veiled, unjustified, force.
Claims to legality say nothing about whether or not something is actually good.
Instead, those who take this position hope to gain legality with the additional expectation
that this legality also comes with the full scope of morality. Simultaneously, we have
given up the idea that moral thought has any weight; yet, appropriated an analogous
structure, without its foundation. In Nietzschean terms, this is akin to secularization while
maintaining the herd morality. If we can make something a matter of law, the argument
follows that the state of “legality” also endows moral legitimacy. We have our agreed
upon standards, and codified them into law. Idiosyncratically, we have chosen to accept
those things which natural law once bolstered - like human dignity and equality, but we
have no rational way of accepting or defending these presuppositions outside o f the law.
Thus, liberalism is the best descriptor of the society of last men:
I bear in the back of my mind that everyone’s equal; to suppose that this (what
I’m doing) is better than that (what he does) is to “discriminate”, a notion that
thus takes its broadest critical scope. Thus there ceases that struggle between
practices whose shifting fortunes once made the society develop; it’s “last”,
because it’s stagnant.10
Having discovered comfort, the last man blinks, and remains unmoved to greatness for
the rest of his days.

Nietzsche’s Critique: Decadence and Comfort in the Modern Age
Nietzsche is not shy about his intent in force when it comes to the revaluation, and
as an anti-egalitarian thinker, it is clear that Nietzsche would disagree with the pervasive
10 Richardson, John, Nietzsche’s System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 167.
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acceptance of liberalism and democracy throughout the modem world. Nietzsche does
not seem to carry the same squeamishness toward his own appropriation o f force, unlike
modem liberals. He embraces it rather fondly as a natural result of the will to power.
More or less, when considering Nietzsche’s view of human dignity we can appropriate
Thucydides “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
Nietzsche’s view of hierarchy leaves little space where we can insert claims to the
justifications for individual right outside of power. The strong are allowed their right to
the will because of their power, and while it is true that power can’t rationally justify
itself, Nietzsche is widely unconcerned with providing reasons for action. The strong do
not endeavor in this exercise of providing justification for their action, as this is a
Platonic action itself. As he so tellingly writes in Genealogy, “what have I to do with
refutations?”11
Man, in Nietzsche’s view, is without the moral attributions bestowed upon him by
the Platonic soul - he is, like the modem liberal has come to view him - markedly
unremarkable in this sense. Yet, this statement comes with a detailed caveat that gives
Nietzsche’s view distinction from other secularized views of man. Rather than lowering
all of man to the realm of subhuman, egalitarianism in Nietzsche’s understanding, we
must be made to recognize the hierarchical nature of man. Thus, we cannot allow man to
wallow in comfort, we must force him to suffer - to separate the excellent from the
common. While there may not be anything special about man in the sense that he is a
creation of the divine, we can realize a parallel meaning to this in great men. There are
among us those higher men —just as there is the herd. This distinction drives two primary

11 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy o f Morals in On The Genealogy o f Morals and Ecce Homo, ed.
Walter Kaufmann and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 18.
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functions of Nietzsche’s theory and are worthy of being stressed here. Nietzsche’s view
of man denies moral standards, and in turn does something the modem liberal can’t seem
to bring himself to do - chooses not to be the nice, well-adjusted observer of other
people’s rights that modem liberals deem “good.”
In Genealogy o f Morals, Nietzsche makes it clear that his vision of good does not
constitute what the herd has come to distinguish as “good.”12 Because of his hierarchical
view of man, Nietzsche cannot be appropriated as a thinker who supports any sort o f
human equality, or at least not the kind of equality that modem liberalism wants to rest its
hat on. Nietzsche would scoff at the attempts of secularized thought to reconstruct the
herd morality, as he would see the endeavors of modem liberalism to be doing just that.
In their moralistic language Nietzsche sees nothing but the will to decline, the pervasive
need for comfort - both through our emotions and our appetitive interest. Nietzsche
denies man needs such comfort. Because of this, modem liberalism has failed in its
revaluation of morals. Essentially, what Nietzsche would argue modem liberalism has
done is re-embrace the slave morality with a Kantian foolishness. Rather, it is this
comfort that is leading him to the road of decay, or the last man.
In this way, Nietzsche is the most consistent thinker to identify this salient point:
why be good once we have accepted that God is dead? Upon what grounds do we so
wholeheartedly accept the unchanging equality of man as a principle so innate to our
nature? Nietzsche challenges modem liberal to evaluate precisely why they hold so dear
to the apparatuses that flow from the herd. Thus, Nietzsche would argue that the modem
world needs a revaluation. While in the modem world we see gestures in this direction, in
the form of relativism and the like, Nietzsche would argue that they have not gone far
12 Nietzsche specifically discusses the origin o f values in The Genealogy of Morals.
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enough. Modernity only possesses one piece of the puzzle. Modem liberalism’s reliance
and idiosyncratic insistence on the making the world a nice place is entirely futile. The
desire for comfort expresses itself in the “nice” mandate. To this Nietzsche responds:
man must transcend, and to do this man must suffer. Transcendence requires a man who
embodies the tragic worldview. He must not turn away from suffering, but rather
embrace the Dionysiac blond beast:
The attainment of this goal would require a different kind of spirit from that likely
to appear in the present age: spirit strengthened by war and victory, for whom
conquest, adventure, danger, and even pain have become needs; it would require
habituation to the keen air of the heights, to winter journeys, to ice and mountains
in every sense; it would require even a kind of sublime wickedness, an ultimate,
supremely self-confident mischievousness in knowledge that goes with great
health; it would require, in brief and alas, precisely this great healthl1
It is through struggle that man becomes strong - both in physical brawn and spiritedness.
The revaluation of morals for Nietzsche does not come with the simple passive
acceptance that God is dead, we need to appropriate an active spirit through the deliberate
and definite reversion of morals. The revaluation, in its attempt to achieve amoralism,
ends in nothing but immoralism.
On this matter Nietzsche is quite plain. Struggle is the vehicle by which man
undertakes self-deification, a process that does not come without great pain and suffering.
As the vehicle for hierarchy, and all great things, man must not hide from suffering in
law, or any other Platonist structure. The Dionysiac tragic hero is not a character who
adheres to the principles of decadence. He must come to the full understanding o f the
nothingness that is reality, and resolve to become the creator of a higher culture:
We should reconsider cruelty and open our eyes. We should at long last learn
impatience lest immodest fat errors keep on strutting about virtuously and saucily,
as have been fostered about tragedy, for example, by philosophers both ancient
13 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 96.
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and modern. Almost everything we call “higher culture” is based on the
spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more profound: this is my proposition.
That “savage animal” has not really been “mortified”; it lives and flourishes, it
has merely become - divine.14
Higher culture requires cruelty. Because of Nietzsche’s views on culture and man, it is
only through this cruel culture that we can create higher men.
Man must take it upon himself to be the creator and value and produce their
Zarathurstra. All creation in this way is inherently destructive, in order to create, I need
to destroy what is already present by unleashing that which is Dionysiac within me. The
vestigial apparatuses of the sick cannot be allowed to continue propping up their
weakness weak. For Nietzsche, the higher men of the future, insofar as they are able to
crush the moral standards that chain them to weakness, will come to redeem the whole of
mankind:
The man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning
ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the
will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision
that liberates the will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man;
this Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness - he must
come one day}5
In this way, Nietzsche sees the overman as a creature that is himself a god. It is from this
beast of prey that Nietzsche’s prophesy of great politics realizes itself. Great politics
requires not only a rejection of Christ, but the acceptance of the most deeply antiChristian values and will to power. A partial revaluation will not suffice, and a partial
acceptance of the Nietzschean logic contains within it no logical reason to “be nice.”

14 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 158.
15 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morals, 96.
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Nietzsche as Progressive: Mark Warren and Readings in Progressive Nietzsche
Despite the inherent violence that underpins Nietzsche’s writings on the
revaluation and the overman, there are some that appropriate the elements of subjectivity
in Nietzsche’s thought to accord with progressive ideals. Man, in this view, does not need
to suffer to realize the station that would grant him the freedom to allow him to exert his
will to power. In his “Nietzsche and Political Philosophy,” Mark Warren calls for a “new
way of relating Nietzsche to political philosophy,” focusing on the subjective elements of
Nietzsche’s thought as a basis by which we can found democratic suppositions. As
Warren writes, “even on the most literal reading o f Nietzsche’s politics we need not make
the methodological assumption that Nietzsche’s politics are uniquely determined by his
philosophy.” 16 Given this view, Warren attempts to remedy what he saw as foresights
within Nietzsche’s own theory through an examination of what he calls Nietzsche’s
“uncritical assumptions.” Among these uncritical assumptions are a misunderstanding on
the part of Nietzsche concerning economic arrangements and bureaucracy.

17

Warren asserts that, while Nietzsche points out the already decaying state of
affairs concerning the devolution of metaphysics, he does not also reject those things that
flow from the understanding of a universal. In other words, Warren contends that
morality is still possible within the Nietzschean society.18 While Warren is correct in this
assertion - at the time of Nietzsche’s writing, as evidenced by “The Parable o f the
Madman,” belief in the universal was falling away, his claim to the existence o f morals in

16 Mark Warren, “Nietzsche and Political Philosophy,” Political Theory 13, no.2 (May 1985): 187.
17 As Warren writes, “Nietzsche did not understand two preeminent modern organizers o f social
life: markets and bureaucracies. This is what left him to assume that modem mass societies must be
accounted for solely in cultural and psychological terms,” p. 208.
18 Warren, “Nietzsche and Political Philosophy,” 191.
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Nietzschean society is specious at best. Nietzsche himself denied standards to the extent
that they were unchangeable. Considering the petulant philosophy he constructs from the
elite, or the noble men, one can assume that Nietzsche would appropriate a kind of
morality to the prevailing attitudes and dispositions to this specific group o f people; yet,
it would be more fitting to the spirit of Nietzsche’s work to describe these as values. In
any event, matters of usage aside, this morality or value system is not an immutable
standard.
Yet, Warren’s analysis goes deeper than this discussion of morality —he couples
this system of valuation with Nietzsche’s argument for autonomy, which he concludes
would necessarily regulate the “moral” considerations of society to trend toward those
things which would allow for the greatest enjoyment of this freedom:
Standards are grounded in values and, if my interpretation is correct, the selfreflective telos of the concept of will to power clearly sanctions some values —
positive freedom, autonomy, individuality, and plurality, for example - and not
others. Taken by itself, Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power should lead to a
high evaluation of social and political organizations that maximize individual
power. 19
Thus, Warren argues, Nietzsche’s philosophy can be used to bolster political
arrangements that set these elements forth in their core values.
Individuality and autonomy were very important to Nietzsche - but equality
unequivocally was not. The will to power is meaningless without the additional
consideration of Nietzsche’s attitudes toward suffering. In the broad sense, in order to
understand excellence, Nietzsche asserted that the pathos of distance was essential. The
sufferings of man in this context are manifold - man must suffer at the hands o f man
(strong vs. weak), he must suffer at the hands of reality (man vs. nihilistic reality) and he

19 Ibid., 205.
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must suffer within himself (man vs. his own internal struggles). To some extent, the case
can be made for equality amongst those who were excellent, and thus deserving of the
individuality and positive freedom granted to them. However, because o f this attitude
toward equality Nietzsche himself would not extend this ability to expend individualistic
capacity to everyone, by sheer virtue of the fact that, for Nietzsche, not everyone is
deserving of it. In this way, we measure the deserving in reference to their strength.
All of this begs the question - does a “high evaluation of social and political
organizations that maximize individual power” necessarily include everyone? I would
argue that it does not, as Warren is silent on where such a standard would come from, if
indeed everyone was somehow entitled to this respect. To this point, as Peter Berkowitz
writes of Warren’s larger work Nietzsche and Political Thought:
Warren concludes that Nietzsche’s central and deepest thoughts, contrary to the
convictions which Nietzsche expressed with unsurpassed vehemence, justify a
politics of “progressive rationalism” combining individual creativity, social care,
pluralism, and egalitarianism. Warren’s vision presupposes some defensible
notion of human respect or the equal right of all to a minimum level of dignity in
society. Yet if there are no moral phenomena, but only moral interpretations.... it
follows that notions of respect and rights are creations, and by no stretch of the
imagination necessary creations of the sovereign or truly sovereign individual.
And are not some sovereigns beneficent monarchs while others ruthless tyrants?20
Berkowitz points out an important consideration regarding Warren’s argument. Without a
universal standard, how do we defend the idea that human beings are deserving of a kind
of respect that would then accord them the ability to pursue their own individuality.
While Nietzsche would argue the pursuit of this endeavor is vital to a life well lived, it is
clear he does not believe that such a universal would exist. Furthermore, he writes in
direct opposition to it. If you couple Berkowitz’s critique with an emphasis on

20
Peter Berkowitz, “Reconstructing Nietzsche as Progressive,” The Review o f Politics 51, no. 4
(Autumn 1989): 628.
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Nietzsche’s view of the necessity of suffering, you see a more complete view o f what
Nietzsche actually intended when he discussed the violence necessary in a world without
moral standards. Because of Nietzsche’s views concerning equality, we can assume that
Nietzsche’s views would most likely align with an aristocracy - where the excellent
among man are allowed to exercise their will over their lessers, who are in turn
subjugated to suffering at the hands of the strong. Given that there is no standard in the
Nietzschean world post-revaluation, it would be difficult to conceive of ways in which
someone would dispute the idea that man was deserving of no such special treatment.

The Case Against Suffering: Nussbaum and Warren Revisited
By accepting Nietzsche’s critique of reason and faith as a basis for morality and
his consequent embrace of perspectival value, Martha Nussbaum nor Mark Warren have
any justification to deny the violence of Zarathustra. Both of their theories presuppose
that man will behave kindly toward one another in the absence of objective morality. It is
my argument, through the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s secular case for suffering that
without such a standard - there is nothing that would compel men to act in a way that
accords with our liberal misgivings about suffering.
Quite the contrary, as Nietzsche demonstrates so nicely, there is nothing
objectively true about the presupposition of human dignity - if you are so inclined to
deny universal. In our desire to “do something” about suffering, we have sought to make
broad claims about how we “should not suffer,” with little in terms of precisely why this
is the case. Neither Nussbaum nor Warren would have a satisfactory answer to the true
Nietzschean overman, who sought nothing more than to exert his will to power over the
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world. In the event their paths, and interests, crossed - on what basis would either theorist
demonstrate an assertion of their own value’s over the Nietzschean overman?
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Conclusion
“1 have come too early,” he said then; “my time is not yet. This tremendous event
is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men.
Lightening and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds,
though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant
from them than the most distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.
- Aleister Crowley, The Law of Thelema

In the final analysis, what is man to do with his suffering? An answer to this
question largely depends on our view of man within the universe, and the significance of
his purpose. Yet, in spite of the varying views to this point, the case Nietzsche makes for
the significance of suffering in the secular world ought to give us pause. Perhaps that is
“Nietzsche’s joke” - that ultimately, what it would take to entirely divorce ourselves
from our moral sentiments would be so inhumane, that it would be utterly unfit for
guiding human life. However, if we want to maintain integrity in textual analysis, we
must assume that the claims Nietzsche and his adherents make are in fact their true
beliefs. Anything less would be a diminution of the entire philosophic endeavor. In
Absence o f Mind, Marilynne Robinson states the following:
We have had a place in the universe since it occurred to the first o f our species to
ask what our place might be. If the answer is that we are an interesting accidental
outcome of the workings of physical laws which are themselves accidental, this is
as much a statement about ultimate reality as if we were to find out that we are
indeed a little lower than angels. To say there is no aspect of being that
metaphysics can meaningfully address is a metaphysical statement. To say that
metaphysics is a cultural phase or misapprehension that can be put aside is also a
metaphysical statement. The notion of accident does nothing to dispel mystery,
nothing to diminish scale.21

21
Robinson, Marilynne, Absence o f Mind: The Dispelling o f Inwardness from the Modern Myth o f
the Self (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 34.
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Robinson’s words are especially poignant within this particular case. The writings of
Nietzsche demonstrate a thorough and poignant understanding of how the end o f the
secular world would look.
Within Nietzsche’s landscape we see a very different picture of life compared to
the modem liberal view. Nietzsche’s picture contains no such images of fairness and
equality, built upon some disembodied view of man as dignified animal. Instead
Nietzsche provides us with the philosopher’s equivalent of Gericault’s famous
“Anatomical Pieces” - and while we may be revolted at this sight, on what grounds have
we to recoil? If man is no longer special or different than the other animals that roam the
earth, what mandates man control those desires which are less than savory?
Perhaps Nietzsche was correct in the assertion he made in “The Parable o f the
Madman,” that he had indeed “come too early.”22 Yet, circling back to my original point,
perhaps the modern world’s inability accomplish the revaluation says something about
the significance of our moral sentiments, that by and large we cannot wipe the instinctive
drive toward the good from our beings. While most philosophical outlooks chalk their
shortcomings in reality up to incompleteness, I would say this is mostly true for
Nietzsche. We have yet to fully adopt his philosophical outlook. While we borrow from
his philosophy as it fits modernity’s need for secularization and our desire to escape the
requirements of morality, it is important to recognize the piece of Nietzschean philosophy
that necessitates man suffer, as for Nietzsche this is a central piece of understanding his
true intent. Perhaps in our weakness, man has yet to accept the full ramifications of

22
1974), 182.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,
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Nietzsche’s theory insofar as we are unable to outwardly say that man is unequal, and
that all men need to suffer.
The squeamishness toward this assertion demonstrates a logic to our moral
compass that is necessarily indestructible. Man finds it relatively easy to accept the first
level of Nietzsche’s argument - that God is dead; but, is unwilling to accept the suffering
that must come along with this, down to re-appropriating what he actually said to fit
better with our own idiosyncratic tastes. Yet, if we accept Nietzsche’s premise that there
are no universal standards encompassed by a discoverable reality, we have little grounds
to reject his values in favor of our own. To put it another way, once we have placed
ourselves on the same level with Nietzsche in terms of objectivity, we have very little left
to offer as justification for why human beings are deserving of “nice” treatment at all.
Within the scope of modem liberalism we have done just that. Simultaneously, we’ve
rejected the idea of the moral universal as a serious basis for inquiry, yet w e’ve also
against suffering and making people feel bad. To put it in Nietzschean terms, we have
accepted the death of God but we’ve not made ourselves worthy yet —Nussbaum and
Warren show that we have not truly undergone a revaluation of all our values and
discarded the remnants of morality. And this may be a clue to the lingering traces of
reason in our moral life - toward the possibilities of natural law.
I argue recognizing that the possibility of truth is essential for conveying
judgments. The concept “should” does not come out of empirical evidence. To say that
there are “X” number of chairs in a room says nothing about how I should fill them, or if
I should fill them at all. In order to make a statement that rests upon the concept of
“should,” I need to render a judgment - a qualitative statement about quantitative
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evidence. If I accept the premise that human beings are reasoning beings, the judgment I
render is authoritative by virtue of its origin in this constituted reason.
The Platonic version of this demonstrates that man’s reason is his participation in
the good, as he writes in Book VI of The Republic, “When reason attains that level and
becomes aware of the whole intelligible order, it descends at will to the level of
conclusions but without the aid of sense objects. It reasons only by using forms. It moves
from forms through forms to forms. And it completes its journey in forms.”

Consider

also what Aquinas says regarding natural law:
“The light of your countenance, O Lord, has been inscribed on us.” The Psalmist
thus signifies that the light of natural reason whereby we discern good and evil is
simply the imprint of God’s light in us. And so it is clear that the natural law is
simply rational creatures’ participation in the eternal law.24
This assertion of human reason couples itself with a distinctively moral understanding of
the universe. At the very least, I must observe basic first principles, or universal, as
immutable and binding. As Hadley Arkes writes in First Things, “Moral statements
purport to speak about the things that are universally good or bad, right or wrong, just or
25

unjust - which is to say, good or bad, right or wrong ,fo r others as well as fo r oneself”

Judgments that entail the full scope of moral logic are justifiable on the grounds that they
are universal.
Yet, it we accept Nietzsche’s premise, that there are no genuinely moral
arguments - we ultimately relegate ourselves to the realm of emotions, instinct, and

23 Plato, The Republic, trans. Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1996), 201.
24 Aquinas, Thomas, Treatise on Law, trans. Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 2000), 9.
25 Arkes, Hadley, First Things: An Inquiry Into the First Principles o f Morals and Justice
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 21.
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interest as justification. While it is most likely true that Nietzsche would detest at least
two of these options, namely emotion and interest, I will save a thorough treatment of this
later. To render “judgments” based on these foundations, we ultimately end up using nonmoral categories as moral categories, which begs the question: why use a non-moral
category for moral ends? All of these are entirely perspectival and relativistic, and
demonstrate something about the individual actor’s disposition at a given moment. Thus,
if we deny the existence of a standard by which all things measure right or wrong, we
leave ourselves no ground to argue against the actions of others, because we do not start
from the principle that we can make judgments that bind ourselves and others:
It would be incoherent, then, to show outrage over the acts of other people if one
held, at the same time, that the standards of moral judgement were irreducibly
personal and subjective. If they were, we would have no grounds for saying that
the person who commits genocide does not in fact do what he regards as just or
good in his own perspective; and if there is nothing other than a “personal”
perspective on these matters, why should we think that our own “personal” view
should be any more accurate or authoritative than his? Outrage and indignation
would be thoroughly out of place, because in the strictest sense, there could be no
ground for a judgment?6
Once you’ve denied the ground for reason in moral universals, you undermine the power
of the category “should,” as well as the position of the individual actor. What the logic of
this argument implicitly demonstrates is an unwillingness to think of oneself as a
reasoning being - you have no such faculty that allows you to access immutable facts
about the universe, because such facts do not exist.
What are human beings within such a society? Instead of viewing human beings
as important and deserving of a certain respect by virtue of some immutable universal,
we must reconceive as human beings as remarkably un-special. In this way, because we

26 Arkes, Hadley, First Things, 22.
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cannot definitively deduce a human nature that is constant, we think of man as little more
than an organism of stimulus response, who acts upon his sum total of prior experience.
Such beings do not have access to moral reason, and thus what we come to understand as
reasons are merely iterations of the subjective factors listed above: appeals to emotion,
instinct or interest.
There is nothing distinctly authoritative or objectively valid in the “it makes me
feel bad” defense, and at the most feelings can only demonstrate how the individual
inwardly feels about a certain scenario. Appeals to emotion as justification, such as “I
feel like I should not be killed,” is not reason, it is description of one’s subjective
feelings. If you are functioning in a society that denies the universal validity o f reason,
why should anyone care per se about your feelings? You have no such standard that binds
people to care, because you yourself have denied the premise that human beings are
deserving of a certain kind of respect universally.
Nietzschean man stands in direct opposition to Platonic man, and given the place
of Platonic philosophy as the cornerstone of western thought, this difference is not one
that fits comfortably alongside everything generally considered to accord with Western
principles. Nietzsche’s man is spiritedness distilled, he is an honor-bound being in search
of the affirmation of life. Untethered from the prison of moral constraint, the Nietzschean
man is jubilant and joyful. In his strength he exercises his instinctive will to power over
the universe - as it is not reality that orders his being, but he who orders reality. In this
way, man is the true measure of the universe and to the extent that man is given the
latitude of excellence, he is able to create and destroy value.

27
For examples o f such a view o f the human person, as stimulus/response organism, see, John
Dewey, Freedom and Culture, (Amherst, N ew York: Prometheus Books, 1989), 40.
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Nietzsche recognizes the inability of his man to act in the universe, because of the
success of the slave revolt. Out of envy and weakness the slave revolt has triumphed over
the strong, constructing a reality in which the good is the ultimate end. Within slave
morality, or Platonism, the strong are tricked into believing that actions on earth smudge
the eternal soul - potentially leading to eternal damnation. The rhetorical change from the
good as synonymous with the noble to the good as synonymous with the weak, or pious,
demonstrates a shift that for the whole of philosophy resulted in innumerable offences to
man’s greater potential. Platonism has chained the will to power, locking it within the
confines of reason and reality. With its ultimate end in the good, Platonism is viewed by
Nietzsche as the will to decline and decay —to support the weak in their envy of the
strong by rendering the strong powerless.
Within this view, we see the doctrine of equality, which Nietzsche rails against
throughout the body of his work. This great leveling destroys the hierarchy that one set
apart the great and strong from the weak and common. Through the conceptualization
and perpetuation of the Platonic soul, man came to understand himself as inherently equal
to his peers. In this way, the subjugation of a people to the category of common, became
thought of as unjust. The sufferings that came along with the Nietzsche’s love of
hierarchy were negated in Platonic reality, and the hierarchy of the blond beast came to
be understood as cruel and base —precisely the opposite of Nietzsche’s intent. Through
the slave revolt, Nietzsche argues that all things that were once considered great in the
pre-moral universe were relegated the beastly or the monstrous, unbefitting to the human
station. Thus, through the constructs of Platonism, the weak are given comfort and refuge
from suffering - they are no longer subjugated to the will of the strong.
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Nietzsche recognizes a fundamental fact about modem society that has come to
fruition in present day - man, more or less, has abandoned the idea that a divine being
gives purpose to the universe or that we can discover any rational reasons to live. While
Nietzsche lauds this act, he recognizes another poignant fact about society - we have not
taken the necessary steps to demolish the remains of the slave morality. In appropriating
Nietzsche’s theory incompletely, man has not equipped himself with the necessary tools
to combat nihilism. In the wake of the proverbial “death of God,” man loses his sense of
purpose and meaning. The immutable truths once considered to be the anchor of the
universe are overturned in light of secularization. Thus, man is faced with the assertion of
Silenus, that the best thing for man is to never have been, and the second best thing is to
die soon. How man brings meaning to his life once more, without falling into the lap of
decadence, is of utmost importance of Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche’s fear that man will
choose the path of least resistance in this regard, setting himself on the path to the last
man.
Nietzsche offers readers Greek tragedy as his solution to the problem of
secularization and loss of meaning, in the hopes that the reappearance of the tragic hero
will reinsert the noble sentiments into society - capturing the ground decadence once
occupied and making room for the higher men. It is through the creative elements of
tragic culture that we can reconnect with the authenticity of man. Through the Dionysiac
and Apolline, man is reunited with his instinctive nature. Through the Dionysiac we see
the expression of philosophizing with a hammer. It is Nietzsche’s hope that man will one
day produce Zarathustra, and regain the tragic culture that produced such higher men.
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Suffering is pervasive throughout Nietzsche’s discussion of tragic culture, and it
is in suffering that man is able to produce excellence. Thus, the creation o f an overman
relies on a culture that enforces such suffering and struggle. Decadence and comfort sit
on the opposite end of this spectrum, as it is out of this struggling that the weak react. In
their search for solace and comfort, the weak continue on toward the society o f last men,
who Nietzsche clearly expresses disdain, and even disgust, for.
In many ways, modem liberal society is an expression of the last men. The West
has turned away from the idea that man needs to suffer, in favor for a palliative care of
the soul. It is under these circumstances that the spirit of the great dies. In desire to justify
those things which are essentially just products of the herd, we turn to our emotions or
utility. These Apolline constructs are merely that, delusions. Yet, Nietzsche would clearly
see them as inherently dangerous. Through these justifications for products o f the weak,
namely equality, we are simply perpetuating the effects of the slave revolt. W e’ve yet to
produce the revaluation of morals to Nietzsche’s satisfaction - and while that may say
something about the essence of man, we should not rule out the dangers we create by
partially accepting his views.
It may be partially true that the full realization of Nietzsche’s prophesy has yet to
hit our doorsteps. Thus far, Nietzsche has been mostly correct in his suppositions of the
result of the “half-revaluation”- or the rejection of God with the rejection o f suffering.
Effectually, the modernized West is the society of the last man. In this society what has
come to be its central feature is a desire not to suffer. We fill our idle time with those
things that bring us the most pleasure, or the most utility, with little regard for what
Nietzsche would have concerned high culture, art and the like. In any case, given some
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day the entrance of an overman to the world stage - on what grounds would we resist his
will to power to turn us, the herd, into his art?
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